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INTRODUCTION 
irtually every criminal justice system today overlaps, interacts, 
and intermingles with other criminal justice systems. The 
traditional model of a single nation-state possessing exclusive 
authority to criminally sanction those within its borders is being 
challenged from below by sub-state demands for communal 
autonomy and from above by international and global assertions of 
criminal jurisdiction.1 The United States is not immune to these 
jurisdictional challenges, as it confronts demands from Native 
American tribes for greater criminal jurisdiction and faces an 
ongoing—if stalled—debate about whether to join the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).2 These battles over criminal jurisdiction are 
part of a greater global debate about what kinds of political power 
ought to reside exclusively within nation-state structures and what 
kinds of power may be allocated to sub-state, supra-state, or other 
non-state entities.3 
It is no surprise that control over criminal justice has become a 
significant jurisdictional battleground between nation-states and their 
sub-state and supra-state challengers, for criminal jurisdiction is still 
considered the sine qua non of state sovereignty.4 If one follows the 
classic Weberian definition of the state—that group in society with a 
monopoly on the exercise of legitimate force5—then criminal justice 
	
1 In addition, nation-states often confront extra-territorial assertions of criminal 
jurisdiction by other nation-states. See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law 
from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2009) (describing and decrying the 
“rise of extraterritorial domestic law”). 
2 See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
3 See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE 22 (2d ed. 2010) (“The assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a 
person is amongst the most coercive activities any society can undertake.”); Dan E. Stigall, 
International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. 
Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 328 (2012) (“It is the primal 
aspect of jurisdiction—its close association with sovereign authority—which also infuses 
it with such conflict-generative potential.”). 
4 The strong connection between the concepts of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territory 
dates back to the consolidation of the Westphalian state system in seventeenth-century 
Europe. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9 
(1995) (tracing the territoriality principle back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648); Shih 
Shun Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline, in 118 STUDIES IN HISTORY, 
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW no. 2, at 37 (The Faculty of Political Sci. of Columbia 
Univ. ed., 1925) (pinpointing 1648 and “the treaties making up the Peace of Westphalia” 
as the moment when the major powers accepted territoriality “as a fundamental principle 
of international intercourse”). 
5 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 
77, 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). 
V
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must be a state function. After all, the criminal law provides a 
mechanism to deter and punish the private exercise of violence and at 
the same time legitimates the exercise of a particular kind of coercive 
force: criminal punishment itself. Thus, any recognition of sub-state 
or supra-state criminal jurisdiction would appear to undermine the 
state’s exclusive sovereignty and admit that other units have 
legitimate coercive power over (at least some of) the state’s citizens. 
This position—often called the Sovereigntist or Nationalist position—
underlies much of the opposition to any form of international or sub-
national criminal jurisdiction.6 The Sovereigntist position has been 
particularly popular in the United States and has succeeded in keeping 
the United States out of the ICC and in severely limiting the criminal 
jurisdiction of Indian tribes domestically.7 
Opposed to the Sovereigntist position are the Internationalist and 
Pluralist points of view, which maintain that international and sub-
national entities, respectively, can and should play a vital role in 
criminal justice. Internationalists extol the importance of strong 
supra-national criminal justice institutions—both those that aim to 
keep national justice systems in conformity with human rights norms, 
such as the regional human rights courts, and those that directly 
prosecute and adjudicate the most serious violations of international 
criminal law, such as the ICC.8 For Internationalists, there are 
universal norms that demand—or at least recommend—international 
enforcement mechanisms. From the other end, Pluralists endorse the 
legitimacy of sub-national community-based criminal justice, 
especially by and for indigenous peoples and other traditionally 
marginalized minority groups. Pluralists emphasize that some sub-
national communities have long traditions of self-governance and can 
articulate and enforce communal norms more effectively for 
themselves than the state structures in which they live.9 For Pluralists, 
	
6 The term Sovereigntist has been in circulation in this sense at least since Peter F. 
Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN 
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2000. This Article’s use of the terms Sovereigntist and Internationalist 
follows the path laid down by Austen Parrish in Reclaiming International Law from 
Extraterritoriality. See Parrish, supra note 1, at 815–16. 
7 See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
8 Among the most prominent Internationalists in the American legal academy today are 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Harold Koh, and Kal Raustiala. See infra notes 59–61 and 
accompanying text. 
9 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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in short, there are communal norms that demand—or at least 
recommend—communal enforcement mechanisms. 
Sovereigntists, Internationalists, and Pluralists each promote the 
legitimacy of a particular level of political organization—whether 
national, international, or sub-national—and aim to lodge criminal 
jurisdiction at that level. What we need today, however, is an account 
of criminal jurisdiction that explains how nation-states can, where 
appropriate, recognize sub-state or supra-state jurisdiction without 
surrendering all supervisory control over that ceded jurisdiction. In 
this Article, I propose a position that is neither strictly Sovereigntist, 
nor wholly Internationalist or Pluralist. I start from the observation 
that criminal jurisdiction can be divided into first-order functional 
jurisdiction and second-order supervisory jurisdiction. Functional 
jurisdiction is the direct authority to criminalize behavior, enforce the 
criminal law, and adjudicate criminal cases. Supervisory authority, on 
the other hand, is the authority to lay down limits to the exercise of 
first-order functional jurisdiction—i.e., limits based on fundamental 
norms—and to enforce those limits. I argue that the United States 
ought to be open to ceding certain elements of first-order functional 
jurisdiction to tribes and to the ICC, but it should insist on retaining 
second-order supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that those entities 
respect the fundamental due process norms embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution. As shorthand, I will refer to my position as Bounded 
Pluralism, for it recognizes the potential value of a plurality of sub-
state and supra-state jurisdictional arrangements, but it demands that 
such jurisdiction be bound by national—that is, American—due 
process norms. Bounded Pluralism can serve as both a descriptive and 
normative approach: some American policies already reflect an 
unarticulated commitment to Bounded Pluralism, and a clear 
expression of the approach suggests a number of significant reforms 
and innovations that have not been proposed to date. 
Bounded Pluralism also illuminates common themes and 
challenges in the seemingly disparate areas of Indian law and 
international criminal law. Although the jurisdictional issues that arise 
in both fields receive significant attention—indeed, jurisdiction is one 
of the central concerns of both fields, both in practice and in academic 
commentary10—such issues are usually considered discretely and by 
	
10 For a discussion of jurisdictional issues in Indian law, see generally Laurie Reynolds, 
“Jurisdiction” in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court 
Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359 (1997). The place of jurisdiction in international criminal 
law is best revealed in the classic book INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO 
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separate sets of specialists. The premise of this Article is that we can 
understand the values at stake in both sub-state and supra-state 
jurisdictional disputes better if we situate them within the larger 
framework of challenges to nation-state authority. Consequently, Part 
I describes the traditional model of exclusive nation-state criminal 
jurisdiction and the challenges that model faces today. I then lay out 
the Sovereigntist, Internationalist, and Pluralist positions with respect 
to these challenges. In Part II, I explain and defend the Bounded 
Pluralism approach. 
In Parts III and IV, I apply the Bounded Pluralism approach to the 
challenges of tribal criminal jurisdiction and international criminal 
jurisdiction, respectively. Sovereigntists, I argue in these Parts, are 
correct that the United States should not accede to sub-state or supra-
state criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens unless such jurisdiction 
conforms to fundamental U.S. due process standards. But, I argue, the 
Sovereigntists demand can accommodate substantial sub-state and 
supra-state functional jurisdiction, so long as the United States can 
maintain meaningful supervisory jurisdiction over tribes and the ICC. 
Federal policy toward tribal criminal law already reflects the principle 
that tribes may exercise (severely limited) functional jurisdiction over 
Indians, but only under the supervisory jurisdiction of federal 
courts.11 Unfortunately, criminal justice in Indian Country today is 
shamefully inadequate and unnecessarily hampered by jurisdictional 
confusion.12 To improve criminal justice in Indian Country, I suggest 
that the United States allow tribes to exercise much greater functional 
jurisdiction in exchange for an enhanced federal supervisory role. 
With respect to international criminal jurisdiction, the United 
States has so far resisted allowing any international institution to 
exercise criminal enforcement or adjudicatory jurisdiction over U.S. 
nationals. But if a mechanism existed to allow U.S. courts to review 
international criminal procedures against Americans, then the United 
States ought to consider joining such institutions, including the ICC. 
In sum, the United States ought to insist on supervisory jurisdiction 
	
U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1987), where 
seven out of fifteen essays fall under the heading “Jurisdiction.” 
11 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
12 See, e.g., Gideon M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law 
and Order Act of 2010, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 139, 149 (2010) (“One of the primary 
culprits of the high rates of crime in Indian Country is the ‘complex patchwork of federal, 
state, and tribal law’ and criminal jurisdiction that allows many perpetrators—particularly 
non-Indians—to go unprosecuted.” (footnote omitted)). 
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over any sub-state or supra-state entity with criminal jurisdiction over 
U.S. nationals, but the United States should be open to granting 
substantial functional jurisdiction to such entities where it retains 
significant supervisory jurisdiction. 
I 
THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND ITS 
CHALLENGERS 
A. The Traditional Model in a Global Context 
Criminal jurisdiction is a sleepy subject—but a sleeping giant. It 
generates few blockbuster cases, takes up almost no space in law 
school curricula (unlike civil jurisdiction), and rarely receives the 
kind of sustained study devoted to civil jurisdiction or to other aspects 
of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure.13 Until recently, 
this general neglect may have been justified by the relative stability of 
criminal jurisdiction doctrine. The doctrine of territoriality—
according to which criminal jurisdiction is determined by the 
territorial location of the crime—seems to answer most questions 
about which criminal justice system has jurisdiction over which 
crimes.14 Under the traditional model, criminal jurisdiction, 
sovereignty, and territory are all congruent and mutually constitutive 
concepts, all tied to the Westphalian vision of the nation-state.15 The 
	
13 The typical first-year Civil Procedure course covers both personal jurisdiction and 
subject-matter jurisdiction extensively. By contrast, typical criminal procedure courses and 
their casebooks do not mention jurisdiction. Compare JOSEPH W. GLANNON ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 37–352 (2011) (devoting over 300 pages of cases and 
materials to the doctrines of civil jurisdiction), with JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. 
THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (2010) 
(including no sections on jurisdiction and no index reference to jurisdiction). 
14 As Justice Holmes put it, “the general and almost universal rule is that the character 
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where 
the act is done.” Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). 
15 Lisa Ford writes of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territory as “[t]he legal Trinity of 
nation statehood.” LISA FORD, SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLE IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836, at 1 (2010); see also M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law, in 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) (“Sovereignty, jurisdiction, 
and territory have traditionally been closely linked.”); Arnold Brecht, Sovereignty, in WAR 
IN OUR TIME 58, 64 (Hans Speier & Alfred Kähler eds., 1939) (“Within a country’s 
boundaries no law counts other than that issued by the sovereign . . . no higher law, no 
imperial law, no divine law, no natural law. There is no appeal to any higher court, no 
arbiter, avenger or ultimate guardian of peace and justice.”); Richard T. Ford, Law’s 
Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 843 (1999) (“We are now 
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traditional model posits a sovereign state as one with ultimate, 
exclusive, and legitimate jurisdiction over people and land within a 
defined territory—and by corollary, no power over people and land 
outside that territory.16 Thus, for any potentially criminal conduct, 
one could determine which criminal code, which prosecutor’s office, 
and which court system had jurisdiction simply by finding the 
location of the crime within a particular sovereign state. 
While still powerful, this traditional model is breaking down. There 
is a growing recognition that, across a range of issues, legal pluralism 
is more often the norm than legal monism.17 The authority of the 
state—understood as jurisdiction or as sovereignty—has never been 
as exclusive or as robust as the traditional models suggests, and the 
process of globalization has exposed just how diffuse and diverse are 
the powers once thought to be exclusive to nation-states.18 Today, 
there is a substantial body of literature discussing particular 
jurisdictional complexities generated by developments, such as the 
increased migration of people and capital across borders, the rise of 
international firms and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the 
global reach of information technology, and the cosmopolitan outlook 
of global elites.19 The interaction of legal regimes that come into 
	
accustomed to territorial jurisdiction—so much so that it is hard to imagine that 
government could be organized any other way.” (emphasis omitted)). 
16 The classic American statement of the exclusive and absolute nature of territorial 
jurisdiction comes in Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any 
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of 
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the 
same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.”). See also ANTONIO 
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 37 (2003) (“Traditionally, individuals have 
been subject to the exclusive (judicial and executive) jurisdiction of the State on whose 
territory they live.”). 
17 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local 
to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 375 (2008) (“Legal pluralism is everywhere. There is, 
in every social arena one examines, a seeming multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest 
local level to the most expansive global level.”). 
18 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 12 (1999) 
(“In contemporary discourse it has become commonplace for observers to note that state 
sovereignty is being eroded by globalization.”). 
19 See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING 
CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996); Paul Schiff Berman, 
The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 181, 183 (1996); Ralf Michaels, 
Territorial Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105 
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contact due to these phenomena—in short, legal pluralism—has 
become the subject of increased attention by scholars, and there is a 
general consensus that legal pluralism is a defining feature of the 
global legal system.20 
B. Challenges to the Traditional Model 
1. Challenges from Below 
The nation-state, which paradigmatically ruled directly and 
uniformly within its territorial borders, is increasingly confronted by 
groups of its citizens demanding separate regimes for themselves. The 
groups making such demands may be defined primarily by regional 
geography (e.g., Northern Italy21), ethno-cultural identity (e.g., 
Kurds22), religious affiliation (e.g., Christians in Iraq23), indigenous 
	
(Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004); Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without 
Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to Protect, 30 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 981 (2009); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 
(2005). 
20 For recent overviews of the literature on legal pluralism, see PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, 
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (2012); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. 
L. SOC. SCI. 243 (2009); and Tamanaha, supra note 17. 
 While the existing literature on legal pluralism has not completely ignored criminal 
jurisdiction, too little attention has been paid to the unique challenges that pluralism 
presents to criminal jurisdiction in particular. After all, the conventional understanding of 
criminal law as a practice and as a concept is uniquely state-centric and territorial. 
Criminal law is the epitome of public law; crimes are understood to be infractions against 
the state, the state is the party that brings criminal charges, and the state is the entity that 
carries out criminal punishment. And at least since Vattel, the principle of territoriality has 
determined criminal jurisdiction. EMER DE VATTEL, 1 THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF 
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 147–48 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867). As 
Professor Lisa Ford notes, the concepts of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territory form 
“[t]he legal Trinity” of statehood. FORD, supra note 15, at 1. Even the most enthusiastic 
legal pluralists, like Professor Berman, admit that nation-states generally still maintain an 
effective monopoly on the use of coercive force within their borders. See Paul Schiff 
Berman, Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 938 
n.32 (2006) (“[T]he power to fine, imprison, physically punish, and conduct military 
operations remains largely a state-based power.”). And because enforcement of criminal 
law consists precisely of the imposition of coercive force in the form of incarceration, 
execution, or other physical punishment, the nation-state remains the entity with the best 
capacity to effectively operate a criminal justice system. 
21 Lindsay Murphy, EU Membership and an Independent Basque State, 19 PACE INT’L 
L. REV. 321, 321–22 (2007) (noting that the Basque region in Spain, Northern Italy, and 
Scotland “are demanding independence and the right to self-determination”). 
22 Steven Menashi, Ethnonationalism and Liberal Democracy, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 57, 
101 (2010) (“The ongoing struggles in Iraq involve the aspirations to self-determination of 
the Kurds, whose national population extends into Turkey and Iran . . . .”). 
WOLITZ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2013  9:23 AM 
2013] Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: 733 
Toward Bounded Pluralism 
status (e.g., Native Hawaiians24), or some combination thereof. And 
the demands such groups make may range from complete 
independence (e.g., Kosovo25) to some form of distinct recognition 
within the existing nation-state (e.g., Catalonia in Spain26). Often, the 
demand for “autonomy” is inchoate; the group challenging nation-
state authority may not be able to articulate exactly which powers it 
wants or in what precise form. Without losing sight of the uniqueness 
of each case, there is a larger category into which these diverse 
demands may be fit—what I am calling Challenges from Below.27 
Demands for more self-government from sub-state actors are not 
new, but since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the volume 
and relative success of such Challenges from Below has been 
notable.28 This larger phenomenon and its implications for a variety 
of legal issues have received extensive treatment elsewhere.29 Here, 
	
23 Phillip Smyth, A New Identity for Middle East Christians, AM. SPECTATOR (July 18, 
2012, 6:07 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2012/07/18/a-new-identity-for-middle-east 
(“By 1979, Iraqi Christians established their own political party, the Assyrian Democratic 
Movement (Zowaa). The Zowaa fought for an autonomous, if not independent territory in 
northern Iraq. Today, the party pushes for the autonomy of Nineveh Plains as a safe-zone 
for Iraq’s Christians.”). 
24 Jennifer L. Arnett, The Quest for Hawaiian Sovereignty: An Argument for the 
Rejection of Federal Acknowledgement, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 171 (2004) 
(“The Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement is gaining speed. Native Hawaiians are 
speaking out in favor of the re-institution of their sovereign rights, and after two centuries, 
people are beginning to listen.”). 
25 Rob Dickinson, The Global Reach and Limitations of Self-Determination, 20 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 367, 371–72 (2012) (describing Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence and an International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion finding that the 
declaration did not violate international law). 
26 Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global 
Age, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1251, 1260–63 (2004) (describing the framework of Catalan 
autonomy within the Kingdom of Spain). 
27 The “challenge” is to conventional nation-state rule, and the word “below” 
distinguishes such challenges emanating from sub-state actors from challenges from supra-
state actors or parallel states. 
28 See Robert D. Sloane, The Policies of State Succession: Harmonizing Self-
Determination and Global Order in the Twenty-First Century, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1288, 1306 (2007) (book review) (“Self-determination reemerged as a major issue in the 
1990s precisely because of the explosion of post-Cold War State successions: The 
dissolution of old States (e.g., the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet 
Union), the emergence of new ones (e.g., Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Georgia, Eritrea), and the (regrettably often related) 
brutal ethnic conflicts within nation-States that had been held together in the past by iron-
fisted rule or Cold War geopolitical forces.”). 
29 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL 133 (1995); NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION (Margaret 
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my concern is limited to demands from sub-state groups for some 
form of criminal autonomy—that is, some special criminal 
jurisdiction—as well as already-operating systems in which criminal 
jurisdiction resides in part in sub-state entities. Demands for criminal 
autonomy may be made explicitly or, more often than not, implicitly 
as part of a larger demand for autonomy across a range of public 
functions. Examples of Challenges from Below that specifically 
demand increased autonomy in the realm of criminal justice include 
those by Acehnese Muslims in Indonesia,30 Mindanao Moro in the 
Philippines,31 the Maori in New Zealand,32 and the Volkstaat (Boer) 
movement in South Africa.33 In the United States, the most relevant 
Challenges from Below come from Native American tribes. Many 
tribes already enjoy significant civil and criminal jurisdiction, but by 
and large seek much greater criminal jurisdiction.34 
2. Challenges from Above 
While demands for sub-state jurisdiction test the nation-state from 
below, the spectacular rise of international criminal law and its claims 
to supra-national jurisdiction challenge states from above. 
International criminal law is a field just now coming into its own, but 
	
Moore ed., 1998); PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2001); Martti Koskenniemi, 
National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 241, 242 (1994). 
30 See generally Moch. Nur Ichwan, The Politics of Shari’atization: Central 
Governmental and Regional Discourses of Shari’a Implementation in Aceh, in ISLAMIC 
LAW IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS 193, 210–15 (R. Michael 
Feener & Mark E. Cammack eds., 2007); Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, INT’L 
CRISIS GROUP (July 31, 2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia 
/indonesia/117-islamic-law-and-criminal-justice-in-aceh.aspx. 
31 See Justin Holbrook, Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism 
from Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 403, 421 n.120 
(2010) (describing disappointment on the part of some Muslim leaders that Shari’a courts 
do not have explicit criminal jurisdiction); see also Robert Winslow, Comparative 
Criminology: Philippines, SAN DIEGO ST. U. ROHAN ACAD. COMPUTING, http://www       
-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/asia_pacific/philippines.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013) 
(“Although Shari’a courts do not have criminal jurisdiction, the MILF [Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front] asserts that its Islamic law courts do.”). 
32 The seminal monograph arguing for a separate Maori criminal justice system in New 
Zealand is MOANA JACKSON, THE MAORI AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE: HE WHAIPAANGA HOU pt. 2 (1988). 
33 See Hercules Booysen, South Africa: In Need of a Federal Constitution for Its 
Minority Peoples, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 789, 795–96 (1997) (describing the 
proposal of the Volkstaat Council to create autonomous Afrikaner territories within a 
federal South Africa). 
34 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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it is not a new phenomenon. At its beginnings, international criminal 
law consisted of particular substantive crimes deemed so damaging to 
world order as to allow for the suspension of the usual territorial 
model of criminal jurisdiction. Piracy is the most established and 
venerable international crime, and since at least the eighteenth 
century, international law has recognized that any sovereign could 
prosecute piracy regardless of the site of the crime, the nationality of 
the perpetrators, or the nationality of the victims.35 The first major 
category of international crime, war crimes, became codified in the 
late nineteenth century in a series of international conventions,36 and 
the war crimes tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World 
War II marked the first institutionalized effort to punish state officials 
via international criminal proceedings.37 
The post–World War II Tribunals were significant because they 
expanded the field—indeed, the very concept—of international 
criminal law from a small list of substantive crimes to encompass 
international institutions and procedures to prosecute and adjudicate 
alleged violations of substantive international criminal law.38 Most 
importantly for our purposes, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
demonstrated that individuals may be subject to criminal prescriptions 
and procedures authored, enforced, and adjudicated not by sovereign 
states, but by a supra-national institution—in that case, the special 
Tribunals themselves. 
For almost fifty years, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
appeared to be aberrations, because the succeeding half-century—the 
Cold War years—saw no further serious attempts to create institutions 
to enforce or adjudicate international criminal law.39 Substantive 
	
35 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71 (“Lastly, the crime of piracy, or 
robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence against the universal law of 
society.”). 
36 See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 38–39 (2003) (summarizing the development and 
codification of war crimes in, inter alia, the Lieber Code (1863), the Oxford Manual 
(1880), and the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)). 
37 See id. at 333 (“For the first time non-national, or multi-national, institutions were 
established for the purpose of prosecuting and punishing crimes having an international 
dimension and scope.”). 
38 Id. 
39 Of course, the idea of an international court with criminal jurisdiction did not die out 
completely during the Cold War years. See id. at 333–34 (noting the 1948 Convention on 
Genocide reference to a future “international penal tribunal” and U.N. International Law 
Commission work on drafting a statute for such a court). But Cold War divisions 
effectively froze any serious development of such an institution. Id. at 334. 
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international criminal law did evolve during these years, primarily 
through adoption of a series of international human rights 
conventions, most importantly the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols.40 These accords broadened the substantive 
provisions of international criminal law and codified the principle of 
universal jurisdiction for particular crimes.41 But they did not lodge 
any enforcement or adjudicative jurisdiction in any entities other than 
nation-states.42 Thus, while the Geneva Conventions’ codification of 
universal jurisdiction for some crimes pushed against the traditional 
jurisdictional principle of territoriality, the Cold War years did not see 
the establishment of supra-national bodies with the power to directly 
enforce international criminal law or adjudicate such cases. 
As the Cold War ebbed in the early 1990s and atrocities in the 
Balkans and in central Africa seized international attention, interest in 
international courts was rekindled. The United Nations Security 
Council created two ad hoc tribunals, one for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and one for Rwanda (ICTR).43 The two ad hoc tribunals were 
given jurisdiction to prosecute and adjudicate cases related to 
violations of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity during the respective conflicts in Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda.44 These international courts and the (briefly) optimistic 
climate of international cooperation of the immediate post–Cold War 
years reinvigorated efforts to create a permanent international 
	
40 See id. at 41. 
41 Id. 
42 The 1949 Geneva Conventions provide for universal jurisdiction over “grave 
breaches” of its substantive provisions and also makes such prosecution (or extradition) 
mandatory on state parties. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“Each 
High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and 
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has 
made out a prima facie case.”). But the Conventions do not provide for international 
institutions to directly investigate, prosecute, or adjudicate alleged violations. See Allison 
Marston Danner, International Judicial Lawmaking: The Yugoslav Tribunal and the Laws 
of War, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC., 162, 162 (2006) (“The possibility of enforcing the 
laws of war in an international court was unanimously rejected by the delegates [to the 
Geneva Conventions].”); Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the 
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2, 13 
(2006). 
43 See CASSESE, supra note 16, 335–40 (summarizing the establishment and operation 
of the two ad hoc tribunals). 
44 Id. at 336. 
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criminal court with the power to enforce international criminal law 
directly against violators who would otherwise go unpunished. 
At the Rome Conference of 1998, the international criminal court 
made the transition from a mere idea to an institution. Over the 
objection of the United States and six other countries, 120 countries 
voted in favor of a treaty—now known as the Rome Statute—to 
create the ICC.45 By July 2002, the Rome Statute had been ratified by 
over sixty countries, and the ICC began operations.46 Today, the 
Court has 121 State Parties and has taken on high-profile 
investigations in Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Uganda, and Libya.47 
In its first ten years, the Court has indicted thirty defendants, 
including two former heads of state, and it recorded its first ever 
conviction in March 2012.48 As I will discuss in more detail in Part 
IV, the United States has to date refused to join the ICC as a State 
Party and has endeavored to ensure that no American ever ends up in 
the ICC docks.49 
While the ICC is the starkest supra-national challenger to the 
traditional model, other international courts and regimes have also 
successfully asserted criminal jurisdiction over functions once 
deemed purely domestic. In particular, regional human rights courts 
have taken it upon themselves to subject national criminal justice 
systems to human rights norms and, on some occasions, to effectively 
force changes in national criminal procedure and substantive criminal 
	
45 Id. at 342–43. Though deemed a court, the ICC contains both a court in the 
adjudicatory sense and a prosecutor’s office. It thus claims elements of both judicial and 
executive jurisdiction. Insofar as case law elaborates on and develops legal doctrine, the 
court also acts in part in a legislative fashion. Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court arts. 9, 21(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] 
(providing that ICC judges may propose amendments to the substantive elements of 
crimes and authorizing ICC judges to “apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in 
its previous decisions”). 
46 About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the 
%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2013). 
47 Assembly of State Parties, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp 
/Pages/asp_home.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2013); Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and 
%20cases.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2013). 
48 Marlise Simons, Congolese Rebel Convicted of Using Child Soldiers, N.Y TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2012, at A12 (reporting on the first—and so far only—ICC conviction); 
International Criminal Court, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International 
_criminal_court (last visited Aug. 9, 2012) (noting that the ICC “has publicly indicted 30 
people” to date). 
49 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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law. The European Court of Human Rights has been the most active 
court in monitoring its member states’ criminal laws and practices, 
and it has found a variety of domestic criminal justice legislation in 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights—including 
sodomy laws in the United Kingdom and Ireland,50 the U.K.’s blanket 
restriction on the voting rights of incarcerated felons,51 and Turkey’s 
ban on wearing religious attire in a public square.52 In sum, today, 
there is a permanent International Criminal Court that claims direct 
enforcement jurisdiction over international crimes, and there are 
human rights courts that claim supervisory jurisdiction over the 
operation of domestic criminal justice systems. Both institutions 
constitute significant and novel challenges to the traditional model of 
state-based territorial criminal jurisdiction. 
C. Sovereigntists, Internationalists, and Pluralists 
How have state officials and legal commentators reacted to the 
challenges to exclusive state-based criminal jurisdiction summarized 
above? Painting with a broad brush, there are three distinct positions: 
Sovereigntist, Internationalist, and Pluralist. 
Sovereigntists decry any perceived diminution in the exclusivity of 
state-based territorial jurisdiction. Sovereigntists welcome neither 
supra-state jurisdictional assertions, like those of the ICC and the 
regional human rights courts, nor sub-national jurisdictional 
assertions by religious, ethnic, or provincial groups seeking more 
autonomy. The Sovereigntist wants to guard the prerogatives of the 
nation-state and maintain as much as possible the traditional 
congruence of sovereignty, territory, and jurisdiction. It is easy to 
understand why state officials and popular nationalists would be 
drawn to the Sovereigntist position, for it explicitly seeks to maximize 
the power of the nation-state and, by corollary, of state officials. But 
the Sovereigntist position has a strong normative cast as well. The 
Sovereigntist sees the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the state as 
	
50 Norris v. Ir., 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1988) (finding Ireland’s sodomy laws 
in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, art. 8 (right to “private and 
family life”)); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1981) (finding 
Northern Ireland’s sodomy law in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
art. 8). 
51 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2005). 
52 Affaire Ahmet Arslan et Autres c. Turquie [Case of Ahmet Arslan and Others v. 
Turkey], App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int 
/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97380 (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
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the hard-won triumph of order and social peace over chaos and 
private violence. The whole point of state-based criminal justice, the 
Sovereigntist argues, is to take the prerogative of coercive physical 
punishment out of private hands and vest it exclusively in a single 
sovereign entity constrained by law. Thus, criminal justice is a core 
state function and one that cannot be shared with other entities, lest 
the chaos and violence of the state of nature reassert itself. With 
respect to international institutions in particular, many Sovereigntists 
in Western democracies also worry about a “democratic deficit.” On 
this account, international institutions lack popular support because 
they are elite creations, they lack democratic accountability because 
there is no particular electorate to whom they are responsible, and 
they lack sufficient respect for liberal norms because they are 
inevitably shaped by the large number of non-liberal states that 
constitute the present international state system.53 Prominent political 
leaders who have voiced the Sovereigntist position in the United 
States include Donald Rumsfeld,54 Bob Barr,55 and John Bolton.56 In 
	
53 For full-throated Sovereigntist arguments against international courts, see JEREMY A. 
RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES 
SOVEREIGN STATES (2005), and John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International 
Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2007) (concluding that the 
“democra[tic] deficit” of international lawmaking “provides a strong argument against 
allowing raw international law to become part of domestic law in any respect”). For a 
more balanced approach, see Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and 
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2006 (2004) (arguing that American 
reluctance to submit itself to international legal processes “reflects an American 
commitment to democratic constitutionalism—which is to say, to self-government”). 
54 See, e.g., Donald Rumsfeld, Op-Ed., Why the U.N. Shouldn’t Own the Seas, WALL 
ST. J., June 13, 2012, at A15 (“The treaty proposes to create a new global governance 
institution that would regulate American citizens and businesses without being 
accountable politically to the American people. Some treaty proponents pay little attention 
to constitutional concerns about democratic legislative processes and principles of self-
government, but I believe the American people take seriously such threats to the 
foundations of our nation.”). 
55 Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Meddling: An 
Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299 (2002). 
56 John R. Bolton & John Yoo, Op-Ed., Restore the Senate’s Treaty Power, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A21 (“America needs to maintain its sovereignty and autonomy, 
not to subordinate its policies, foreign or domestic, to international control.”); John Bolton, 
The Coming War on Sovereignty, COMMENT. (Mar. 2009), https://www.commentary 
magazine.com/article/the-coming-war-on-sovereignty (“[T]he nation’s governing elite is 
in the process of taking a sharp, indeed radical, turn away from the principles and practices 
of representative self-government that have been at the core of the American experiment 
since the nation’s founding. The pivot point is a shifting understanding of American 
sovereignty.”); see also John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 205 (2000). 
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the legal academy, John Yoo,57 Jack Goldsmith,58 and Jeremy 
Rabkin59 are identified as Sovereigntists.60 
Internationalists, contra Sovereigntists, welcome and promote the 
increasing claims of supra-national criminal jurisdiction by regional, 
global, and other international institutions. Internationalists point to 
the general increase in transnational crime, the global commitment to 
human rights, and growing cosmopolitan identities as grounds for 
creating and sustaining international institutions with direct power 
(i.e., jurisdiction) over criminal justice matters of international 
import.61 International criminal jurisdiction, on this account, serves as 
an important mechanism for both managing the challenges of 
globalization and for institutionalizing universal human rights 
norms.62 Internationalists do not necessarily seek to delegitimize 
traditional nation-states and territory-based criminal jurisdiction. 
Rather, they aim to supplement such jurisdiction with effective and 
robust international regimes that can tackle transnational criminal 
problems, constrain the exercise of illegitimate state power, and, 
where necessary, fill in the gaps when no national jurisdiction is 
willing or able to investigate or prosecute significant crimes. For 
Internationalists, the establishment of the ICC is the culmination of a 
	
57 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 89 (1998) 
(arguing that vesting public authority “in officials who are not officers of the United States 
risks offending both the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty underlying our 
Constitution and the Appointment Clause’s basic goal of government accountability” 
(footnote omitted)). 
58 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 21–22 (2007) (referring to John Yoo as a fellow “new 
sovereigntist”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
59 See, e.g., RABKIN, supra note 53; JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: 
WHY THE WORLD SHOULD WELCOME AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004). 
60 Peter J. Spiro was the first to identify this group of scholars and political figures as 
“sovereigntists” in The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False 
Prophets. Spiro, supra note 6, at 9. 
61 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World 
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 288, 325–26 (2004) (“The best illustration of the new 
sovereignty can be found in the operation of ‘government networks’—networks of 
national government officials of all kinds operating across borders to regulate individuals 
and corporations operating in a global economy, combat global crime, and address 
common problems on a global scale.”). 
62 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military 
Tribunals to the International Criminal Court, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 3, 18 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 
2002). 
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longstanding dream to create a permanent international court with 
direct jurisdiction over individuals alleged to have committed the 
most serious international crimes.63 Internationalists also support the 
regional human rights courts that act as quasi-constitutional checks on 
national criminal justice institutions.64 And many Internationalists—
though not all—continue to advocate for universal jurisdiction by 
nation-states and the development of international criminal law at the 
nation-state level.65 At the popular level, Internationalism is 
championed by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International. At the scholarly level, Anne-Marie Slaughter,66 Harold 
Koh,67 and Kal Raustiala68 generally write from an Internationalist 
position. 
The third extant position is what I call Pluralism.69 Pluralists 
emphasize the multiple overlapping normative communities that exist 
within (and across) the boundaries of the nation-state. While the 
Internationalist welcomes challenges “from above,” the Pluralist 
	
63 See, e.g., Robert Badinter, International Criminal Justice: From Darkness to Light, 
in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 
supra note 62, at 1931. 
64 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (praising the European Court of 
Human Rights as an effective supra-national legal body). 
65 See, e.g., PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at 
http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf (an attempt by leading scholars and 
jurists to provide guidance to the national application of universal jurisdiction to criminal 
prosecutions); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 
41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2005) (arguing for “the participation of the ICC in mixed 
tribunals that would be established in the state most directly affected by a prosecution”). 
66 See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 64; Slaughter, supra note 61, at 325–
26. 
67 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999). 
68 See generally Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 
(2002). 
69 My use of the term Pluralist in this Article is related to, but distinct from, the more 
general concept of legal pluralism as that term is usually used. Legal pluralism is a 
contested concept, but it generally refers to a state of affairs in which multiple legal 
regimes coexist within a single social sphere. See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 17, at 375 
(“Legal pluralism is everywhere. There is, in every social arena one examines, a seeming 
multiplicity of legal orders, from the lowest local level to the most expansive global 
level.”). A Pluralist, as I use the term, is someone who has a normative commitment to 
recognizing and empowering a multiplicity of legal (and quasi-legal) regimes in addition 
to official nation-state legal systems. 
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welcomes challenges “from below.”70 Pluralists are comfortable with 
jurisdictional arrangements that vest formal (and informal) authority 
in institutions, organizations, and communities other than the nation-
state. It is, in fact, these non-state communities that exert effective 
control over behavior in many spheres of life, the Pluralist argues, so 
the formal state that fails to acknowledge, respect, and interact with 
these communities’ already-existing authority is doing its citizens a 
disservice. Pluralism, on this account, simply acknowledges the 
reality of these sub-state normative regimes—whether based on 
indigenous, ethnic, religious, or geographical identities—and seeks to 
negotiate the inevitable tensions between the formal nation-state legal 
system and the various sub-state regimes.71 Of course, a Pluralist 
need not support every assertion of jurisdiction by every community, 
and a Pluralist may still privilege the formal state legal system in 
certain jurisdictional disputes. But the Pluralist is committed to taking 
sub-state assertions of jurisdiction seriously and is, in principle, open 
to vesting real criminal jurisdiction in sub-state entities. In the 
academic literature, Paul Berman is perhaps the leading Pluralist 
theorist, while the many advocates for particular sub-state 
jurisdictional distributions—e.g., indigenous rights advocates or 
autonomous region advocates—write from an implicitly Pluralist 
perspective.72 
These brief, idealized descriptions of Sovereigntism, 
Internationalism, and Pluralism do not do justice to the nuances of the 
various approaches nor to the significant range of differing opinions 
within each stream. Still, at base, each approach advises the nation-
state—the United States government in particular—that it should 
	
70 Of course, one could be both an Internationalist and a Pluralist without direct 
contradiction, but it is important to distinguish the two positions. Internationalists tend to 
promote global governance and legal convergence, while Pluralists celebrate local 
diversity and legal divergence. Internationalists, in other words, are by and large engaged 
in a project of uniformity while Pluralists revel in variety. 
71 See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. 
SCI. 225, 239 (2009) (“In a plural world, law is an ongoing process of articulation, 
adaptation, rearticulation, absorption, resistance, deployment, and on and on. It is a 
process that never ends, and international law scholars would do well to study the 
multiplicity and engage in the conversation, rather than impose a top-down framework that 
cannot help but distort the astonishing variety of law on the ground.”). Those who embrace 
federalism “all the way down” and/or the principle of subsidiarity may be included in the 
Pluralists’ fold. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20–21 (2010) (“I both insist that federalism must be pushed all the 
way down and link our failure to do so to the hold that sovereignty exerts on our collective 
imagination.”). 
72 See generally BERMAN, supra note 20; Berman, supra note 71. 
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either resist or embrace sub-national and/or supra-national 
jurisdiction. But a posture of steadfast resistance or open-ended 
embrace is neither realistic nor pragmatic. What we need is a more 
sophisticated understanding of the varieties of criminal jurisdiction, a 
realistic appraisal of the jurisdictional status quo, and an account that 
demonstrates how the United States might accept certain sub-state or 
supra-state assertions of jurisdiction while maintaining significant 
control over the exercise of such jurisdiction with respect to 
Americans. 
II 
TOWARD A MIDDLE PATH-BOUNDED PLURALISM 
Because neither nation-states nor their sub-state and supra-state 
challengers are going away any time soon, it is incumbent on 
policymakers and legal commentators to think more carefully about 
arrangements and models that can manage overlapping claims to 
criminal jurisdiction. In this Part, I explain why a better understanding 
of criminal jurisdiction can lead to a position that is neither rigidly 
Sovereigntist, nor naively Internationalist or Pluralist. The key point 
is that criminal jurisdiction is not a single thing; it is a concept 
encompassing a great variety of particular authorities vested in 
particular institutions performing particular functions. Most 
significantly, there is a distinction between first-order functional 
jurisdiction—the kind of jurisdiction that allows for criminal 
legislation, enforcement, and adjudication—and second-order 
supervisory jurisdiction that tries to keep the operation of functional 
jurisdiction within fundamental normative bounds (e.g., constitutional 
constraints or human rights standards). The United States, I argue, 
should be open to sharing functional criminal jurisdiction with its 
jurisdictional challengers from below and from above, but it should 
do so only when it has assurances that (a) the criminal processes of 
the sub-state or supra-state entities are designed to ensure due process 
and (b) the United States, through its federal court system, retains 
supervisory jurisdiction to review convictions of U.S. citizens by sub-
state or supra-state criminal processes. This is, in short, a compromise 
position that acknowledges the legitimacy of sub-state and supra-state 
criminal jurisdiction while holding fast to the constitutional obligation 
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not to allow its citizens to “be deprived of life [or] liberty . . . without 
due process of law.”73 
A. Functional Jurisdiction and Supervisory Jurisdiction 
Criminal jurisdiction is, like the famous description of property, a 
bundle of sticks—not a unitary power. Criminal jurisdiction is usually 
understood as constituting three different types of power: legislative 
(or prescriptive), executive (or enforcement), and judicial (or 
adjudicatory).74 These are the first-order functions of a criminal 
justice system—to define crimes, to punish them, and to ensure fair 
adjudication of such punishment. 
Each type of jurisdiction plays a particular role in the larger 
criminal justice system, and particular institutions are tasked with 
carrying out each kind of functional jurisdiction. Prescriptive 
jurisdiction constitutes the power to criminalize conduct (or 
omissions); it is traditionally monopolized by a state legislature and 
reaches only conduct within the state’s territory.75 Executive 
jurisdiction constitutes the legitimate authority to enforce criminal 
laws through policing, investigating, prosecuting, and administering 
punishment consistent with the laws. Under the traditional model, 
these executive functions are monopolized by the state through 
specialized state agencies, such as the police and prosecutor’s office, 
and these executive agencies’ authority to act—i.e., jurisdiction—is 
limited to the territory of the state. In most developed criminal justice 
systems, a number of institutions are tasked with exercising executive 
criminal jurisdiction. In addition to police departments and 
	
73 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
74 Sometimes, criminal jurisdiction is divided into prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction, with judicial jurisdiction folded into enforcement on the theory that 
adjudication is part of the enforcement mechanism. I separate out enforcement and 
adjudicatory jurisdiction because, in any advanced criminal justice system, a variety of 
executive-branch institutions carry out enforcement while adjudication is typically heard 
by a neutral judicial branch official—namely a judge. 
75 While the territoriality principle—limiting prescriptive jurisdiction to acts within the 
territorial bounds of the state—is the most venerable basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, 
there are a number of long-standing bases for extra-territorial jurisdiction, as well. As a 
matter of international law doctrine, in addition to territoriality, the nationality principle 
allows state sovereigns to exert prescriptive criminal jurisdiction over their nationals 
outside of the state’s territory. More controversially, under the protective and passive 
personality principles, states may criminalize the conduct of foreigners acting abroad when 
the conduct threatens certain state interests or state citizens, respectively. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 
cmts. a–i. 
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prosecutor’s offices, there are likely to be crime laboratories, 
specialized investigation units, a bureau of prisons, parole boards, and 
reentry programs, among others. The executive institutions are the 
institutions with which ordinary people are likely to have the most 
contact. Finally, judicial jurisdiction is what lawyers and judges 
usually mean when they discuss jurisdiction—the power of a court to 
hear and render a verdict on a criminal prosecution—i.e., to 
adjudicate. Here too, the traditional territoriality principle generally 
provides an answer to whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a 
criminal case before it: if the alleged crime took place within the 
predetermined territorial boundaries of the court’s jurisdiction, then 
the court has the authority to hear the case and determine a verdict. 
In addition to the various types of functional jurisdiction, advanced 
criminal justice systems also maintain a second-order supervisory 
jurisdiction—or power of review—over the exercise of first-order 
functional jurisdiction. This second-order supervisory review exists to 
ensure that the exercise of functional jurisdiction conforms to 
fundamental normative commitments—e.g., constitutional or human 
rights or due process standards. Supervisory jurisdiction may exist 
within a single legal system, as when a state appellate court reviews a 
state trial court’s procedure for adherence to state constitutional 
standards. Or supervisory jurisdiction may exist across legal systems, 
as when a federal court reviews the actions of a state court or a state 
policeman or a state legislature for adherence to federal constitutional 
standards. The key is that an institution may have supervisory 
jurisdiction without any functional jurisdiction. 
The U.S. federal system provides an example of how supervisory 
and functional jurisdiction can interact across judicial systems. While 
state criminal justice systems enjoy full-spectrum functional 
jurisdiction—that is, they have full legislative, executive, and judicial 
jurisdiction—the exercise of any state jurisdiction is subject to federal 
constitutional constraints. A state legislature may not, for instance, 
criminalize activity that is constitutionally protected—e.g., buying 
birth control or engaging in a consensual sexual relationship.76 Thus, 
a state’s legislative jurisdiction is limited by federal constitutional 
standards. A state police force may not investigate crimes by 
	
76 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding unconstitutional the 
criminalization of “private sexual conduct”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 
(1965) (holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use of contraception). 
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conducting “unreasonable searches or seizures.”77 Thus, a state’s 
enforcement jurisdiction is limited by federal constitutional standards. 
And a state court may not deny a criminal defendant the right to 
counsel or the right to a jury trial.78 Thus, a state’s judicial 
jurisdiction is also limited by federal constitutional standards. To 
ensure that the state criminal justice system conforms to these federal 
constitutional standards, state criminal defendants alleging a breach in 
constitutional standards have essentially two mechanisms for reaching 
federal review: the certiorari process on direct appeal and post-
conviction federal habeas.79 Review in both cases is limited to 
allegations that the conviction violated federal standards; neither 
certiorari nor habeas provides for anything like a new trial at the 
federal level.80 
Supervisory jurisdiction exercised by one legal system over 
another necessarily limits the discretion of the supervised legal 
system, but it does not negate or overwhelm the autonomy of the 
supervised criminal regime. Despite the application of federal 
constitutional norms to state criminal justice systems—i.e., despite 
the limits—American states still act independently in the field of 
criminal justice and, indeed, are still the overwhelming actors in 
criminal justice in the United States.81 The states are not merely 
administrative units of the federal criminal justice system—far from 
it. The states pass criminal laws, enforce them, and adjudicate cases 
independently, and the very real differences in state criminal laws, 
enforcement policies, and judicial processes attest to the robust 
jurisdictional autonomy states have to craft their own criminal justice 
regimes.82 Even with federal courts playing a supervisory rule, the 
	
77 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures”); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (requiring reasonable suspicion before police may conduct 
an investigatory arrest). 
78 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VII (guaranteeing rights to counsel and to jury trial). 
79 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (federal habeas statute covering state criminal 
defendants); SUP. CT. R. 10–16 (laying out rules related to “jurisdiction on writ of 
certiorari”). 
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; SUP. CT. R. 10–16. 
81 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(b) (4th ed. 2004) 
(noting that “the federal system is responsible each year for less than 2% of the total 
number of criminal prosecutions brought in the United States and less than 4% of all 
felony prosecutions”); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (noting that states 
maintain “primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law”). 
82 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.2(a) (“Under the American version of 
federalism, the federal (i.e., national) government and each of the fifty states has 
independent authority to enact criminal codes applicable within the territorial reach of its 
legislative powers. Each also has the authority to enforce those criminal laws through its 
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states exercising first-order functional jurisdiction are not agents 
carrying out the orders of a hierarchically superior principal. Rather, 
states are pursuing their own aims in the articulation, enforcement, 
and adjudication of criminal law. In thinking about criminal 
jurisdiction, then, it is important to distinguish between the multiple 
first-order functions of a criminal justice system and the second-order 
supervisory jurisdiction that endeavors to keep the first-order 
jurisdiction within certain normative bounds. 
What we can see after we unbundle criminal jurisdiction into its 
constituent parts is that jurisdictional overlap (or pluralism) can take 
on many different forms. It is not necessarily the case that each entity 
claiming criminal jurisdiction is claiming “full-spectrum” criminal 
jurisdiction; rather, the claim may be limited to some slice of 
functional or supervisory jurisdiction. For instance, a sub-state group 
may demand or maintain its own court system (judicial jurisdiction) 
or its own prosecution service (executive jurisdiction) without 
demanding the authority to create or define crimes (legislative 
jurisdiction).83 Regional human rights courts claim supervisory 
jurisdiction over domestic criminal justice jurisdiction, but such 
courts make no claims to exercise first-order functional jurisdiction. 
Pluralism in criminal justice thus need not take the form of two or 
more full-spectrum criminal jurisdictions overlapping. Moreover, it is 
possible to separate out functional jurisdiction and supervisory 
jurisdiction and assign them to different legal systems. 
B. The Bounded Pluralism Approach 
The conceptual distinction between functional and supervisory 
jurisdiction allows for the articulation of a moderate and principled 
approach to sub-state and supra-state jurisdictional challenges. Simply 
put, the United States ought to be amenable to granting legitimate 
	
own criminal justice process—that is, through its own criminal justice agencies and its 
own laws of criminal procedure. Thus, we have, in many respects, fifty-one different 
criminal justice processes in this country, one for each of the states and one for the federal 
government.”). 
83 In the German federal system, for instance, the substantive criminal code and the 
code of criminal procedure are set by the national legislature, but the Länder do most of 
the enforcement of the code and adjudication of criminal cases. See Shawn Marie Boyne, 
The Cultural Limits on Uniformity and Formalism in the German Penal Code, 58 CRIME 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 251, 254–55 (2012) (describing German federalism in the context of 
criminal justice). In other words, legislative jurisdiction is national, but executive and 
judicial jurisdiction are sub-national. 
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sub-state and supra-state entities significant functional criminal 
jurisdiction, but any functional jurisdiction exercised by such an 
entity against a U.S. citizen ought to be subject to fundamental due 
process constraints and supervisory jurisdiction by the U.S. court 
system. In other words, where appropriate, the United States should 
offer its primary sub-state and supra-state jurisdictional challengers a 
deal: substantial functional jurisdiction in exchange for compliance 
with due process norms and some form of review to ensure such 
compliance. I will call this the Bounded Pluralism approach. In fact, 
current doctrine and U.S. policy with respect to tribal jurisdiction and 
international criminal jurisdiction already somewhat reflects the 
Bounded Pluralism approach,84 but the principle has not yet been 
clearly articulated in law or policy. In this section, I will explain the 
normative rationale behind the approach and situate it within the 
debate between Sovereigntists, Internationalists, and Pluralists. In the 
next two Parts, I will describe in more detail how the Bounded 
Pluralism approach can help guide U.S. law and policy with respect to 
tribal criminal jurisdiction and international criminal jurisdiction, 
respectively. 
I use the term “Bounded Pluralism” to describe a state of affairs in 
which one legal system has supervisory jurisdiction with respect to 
another legal system’s functional jurisdiction. Bounded Pluralism is 
almost by necessity a state of significant tension. The entity subject to 
limits on its jurisdiction will feel that its very jurisdictional 
independence is being trampled when it brushes up against those 
limits, and the reviewing entity will often feel tempted to take over 
the direct functional exercise of authority in order to ensure 
compliance with its norms. In the American federal regime, this 
dynamic plays out fairly regularly across a range of criminal justice 
matters.85 The post-1960s expansion of federal habeas review of state 
criminal convictions has polarized officials and commentators into 
two broad camps: those who think the federal intrusions into state 
criminal procedure have gone too far in eroding state control over 
criminal justice,86 and those who think that federal intrusions should 
	
84 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
85 See, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 645–46 (1997) (describing debate about growing “federalization” 
of criminal law); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: 
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977). 
86 The classic article arguing that federal habeas doctrine impinges too much on state 
prerogatives is Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). 
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go much further so as to vindicate federal constitutional norms.87 
Intersystemic tension has its costs, of course—repeated intrusions into 
another legal regime really do eat into the scope of independence 
(jurisdiction) that the other regime possesses, and repeated defiance 
by the supervised regime really does require more oversight by the 
reviewing regime. 
But as students of American federalism have argued, there is a 
creative dynamic at work in Bounded Pluralism as well. Writing in 
the context of federal review of state criminal procedure, Professors 
Aleinikoff and Cover argued persuasively that a model of pluralism 
“premised upon conflict and indeterminacy” and shot through with 
redundancy and overlapping areas of jurisdiction has the advantage of 
spurring genuine dialogue between the legal regimes.88 Federal court 
review of state procedures is at its best, they argue, when it constitutes 
a dialogue between the systems about what federal constitutional 
norms require, leading both legal systems themselves to adopt 
reforms consistent with constitutional norms.89 This federal-state 
dialogue—far from being a one-way imposition—allows for a full 
airing of the values at stake for each side in any given area of review. 
The states are not treated as naughty children, but rather as 
jurisdiction-bearing adults with the legitimate concerns of running a 
functional criminal justice system. The federal judiciary, for its part, 
becomes better attuned to the concerns of the states’ criminal justice 
systems and has the benefit of hearing how pronouncements about 
procedural rights affect ground-level criminal justice.90 
	
87 See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension 
Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modern 
Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1302 (2008) (“Over 
the past fifty years, since the doctrine of selective incorporation was announced, 
limitations on federal habeas review and the Court’s willingness to permit variation as to 
substantive rights announced under the Eighth Amendment have effectively rendered the 
promise of uniformity in the enforcement of the Bill of Rights hollow.”). 
88 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 85, at 1048. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1046–47. Robert Ahdieh has extended the work of Aleinikoff and Cover to the 
relationship between supra-state institutions and those of nation-states. Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 2029 (2004). Ahdieh argues for the benefits of “a pattern of dialectical review 
between international and national courts [which] can help to facilitate the emergence, 
evolution, and internalization of universal norms of due process.” Id. at 2030. Ahdieh’s 
work points out that, in the international context, it is often the nation-state itself that is 
under the supervision of supra-national legal entities. Id. at 2033. One example of this 
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The Bounded Pluralism that we see in American federalism, while 
full of tensions and problems, offers the best model for U.S. policy 
toward its sub-state and supra-state jurisdictional challengers. The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution guarantee 
that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty “without due process 
of law.”91 And while the interpretation and construction of that simple 
phrase has been—and continues to be—subject to serious and 
voluminous debate, the core ideal of due process in criminal justice is 
that nobody may be punished unless the process leading to such 
punishment is fundamentally fair and procedurally scrupulous.92 To 
be sure, the Due Process Clause applies directly to the actions of the 
federal and state governments in the criminal justice system; it does 
not apply to the actions of tribal governments or international 
organizations.93 So the argument here is not that tribal and 
international processes must, under current constitutional doctrines, 
conform to the U.S. Constitution; it is a legal policy argument that the 
United States ought to seek to ensure due process protections for its 
citizens subject to any sub-national or supra-national criminal 
jurisdiction. After all, the principle behind due process protections—
that individuals should not be subject to loss of life or liberty (i.e., 
criminal punishment) except via fundamentally fair procedures—does 
not depend on the federal or state identity of the system exercising 
criminal jurisdiction. From the perspective of an individual defendant, 
whether it is a state policeman or a tribal prosecutor or an 
international judge who acts unfairly makes no difference. 
	
form of bounded pluralism is the relationship of the European Court of Human Rights to 
the national courts of its member states. Id. 
91 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
92 See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“The failure to accord an accused 
a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. ‘A fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” (citations omitted)). 
93 On their own terms, the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clauses apply to federal and state action, respectively. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
With regard to Indian tribes, see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) 
(“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been 
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as 
limitations on federal or state authority. Thus, in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), 
this Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not ‘operat[e] upon’ ‘the powers of local 
self-government enjoyed’ by the tribes. In ensuing years the lower federal courts have 
extended the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
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Fundamentally fair procedures ought to be the precondition of any 
criminal punishment, regardless of the jurisdictional lines.94 
Sovereigntists, then, are correct that the U.S. should not accede to 
sub-state or supra-state criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens unless 
such jurisdiction conforms to fundamental U.S. due process 
standards. This requires that any sub-state or supra-state regime adopt 
internal procedures consistent with due process before the United 
States recognizes its criminal jurisdiction and that, even after 
recognizing its functional jurisdiction, the United States retain some 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that due process norms are in fact 
followed. Such supervisory jurisdiction can take the form of habeas 
review. There are, of course, significant criticisms of the current 
operation of federal habeas review with respect to state prisoners. 
Many commentators argue that the grounds for habeas review are too 
many (or too few), that the burden of proof is too high (or too low), 
that habeas focuses too much (or too little) on process at the expense 
of substantive guilt and innocence.95 Likewise, there is a long history 
of debate about what exactly constitutes “due process of law” in 
criminal procedure: is due process simply the enumerated rights of the 
first eight constitutional amendments, or is it an independent standard 
encompassing more or, perhaps, less than the other Bill of Rights 
provisions?96 Resolving these long-standing debates is far beyond the 
scope of this Article, and unnecessary for the argument advanced 
here. However the courts and “We The People” resolve these debates 
	
94 Of course, the United States cannot guarantee its citizens abroad a fair trial in foreign 
legal systems. When an American goes abroad, he or she is typically subject to the full-
spectrum criminal jurisdiction of the foreign state where he goes, and he has no right to 
U.S. review of any criminal punishment imposed by the foreign state. In those situations, 
there is no mechanism for the U.S. to take any jurisdiction—functional or supervisory—
over the case. But with sub-state or supra-state jurisdiction, the reason the federal 
government can and ought to demand due process compliance is that the United States 
could itself seize direct functional jurisdiction over the case if it so chose. In other words, 
the United States is ceding jurisdiction to sub-state or supra-state entities, and my 
argument is that the United States should not do so unless it can be assured that its citizens 
will enjoy due process protections under the sub-state or supra-state regime. 
95 For a good review of the debates over federal habeas corpus, see David McCord, 
Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735 (1994), and Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling 
Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 582–88 (1993). 
96 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (“In the field of criminal 
law, we have defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very 
narrowly based on the recognition that, ‘[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.’” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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about the meaning of due process, those minimum standards of 
fundamental fairness ought to apply to sub-state and supra-state 
entities seeking criminal jurisdiction over Americans. 
Where Bounded Pluralism differs from the Sovereigntist position is 
in recognizing the legitimacy of functional criminal jurisdiction at a 
sub-state or supra-national level. There is nothing unique about the 
nation (or the state) that gives it an exclusive warrant to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction. And there can be significant values associated 
with certain sub-state or supra-state assertions of criminal jurisdiction. 
Of course, not every entity demanding its own criminal justice system 
deserves one. But in the particular cases of interest to us here—tribal 
criminal jurisdiction and international criminal jurisdiction—the 
values are particularly compelling and worth briefly restating. 
The United States has long recognized the unique communal status 
of Native American tribes; the fact that they have exercised powers of 
self-government longer than the United States itself; and the history 
of dispossession, discrimination, and decimation they have faced.97 
At least since the Indian New Deal of the 1930s, the federal 
government has explicitly pursued a policy of encouraging tribal self-
government, while the Supreme Court has referred to tribes as 
“dependent sovereign[s]” and “separate people[s] with the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations.”98 The Supreme Court 
and Congress have time and again recognized the “inherent” power of 
Indian tribes to operate their own criminal justice systems.99 
	
97 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (describing Indian 
tribes as “distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights” in matters of local self-government). 
98 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2004) (referring to Indian tribes as 
“dependent sovereign[s]” and noting that “Congressional policy . . . now seeks greater 
tribal autonomy within the framework of a ‘government-to-government relationship’ with 
federal agencies”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886) (“They were, 
and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they 
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their 
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the 
State within whose limits they resided.”); see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“It must always be remembered that the various 
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to 
sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law 
of the American West: A Critical Bibliography of the Nonlegal Sources, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
953, 977 (1987) (“The centerpiece of the ‘Indian New Deal’ was the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, which brought the allotment policy to an end and promoted 
tribal self-government.” (footnote omitted)). 
99 Lara, 541 U.S. at 197, 204 (reiterating that the power of a tribe to criminally 
prosecute its own members is “inherent”). While the term “sovereignty” is often used as a 
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Recognition of tribal criminal jurisdiction thus reflects a deep 
commitment to Indian communal survival, tribal autonomy, and self-
regulation.100 Simply put, the United States honors its “first nations” 
when it recognizes that they can and do exercise criminal jurisdiction 
in their own sphere of self-government. 
For its part, the international criminal jurisdiction of the ICC 
reflects the significant human rights values that have formed the 
normative bedrock of the international system since the end of World 
War II.101 The particular international crimes under ICC jurisdiction 
are precisely the crimes that constitute the gravest violations of 
human rights—war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.102 
These are crimes that the United States already recognizes as crimes 
of an international character—and crimes that demand 
accountability.103 Indeed, the United States itself set up the first major 
international courts to exercise direct enforcement and adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over such crimes, namely the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals. And the United States long supported the establishment of 
a more permanent court to prosecute and try such crimes.104 One need 
not be starry-eyed about the “international community” to think that 
	
rationale for tribes’ unique powers of self-government, including criminal jurisdiction, my 
argument here is not that tribes ought to have criminal jurisdiction because they are 
sovereign. Rather, the argument is that the tribes’ actual history and current practice of 
self-government coupled with their indigenous status gives rise to a legitimate claim for 
criminal jurisdiction. 
100 Id. at 197 (“[T]his Court has held that an Indian tribe acts as a separate sovereign 
when it prosecutes its own members.”). 
101 See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 62, at 18 (describing the ICC as “the central pillar in 
the world community for upholding fundamental dictates of humanity”). 
102 Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 5, § 1. The crime of aggression was also included 
in the Rome Statute, but its precise definition was left open pending further negotiations 
on its elements. See id. art. 5, § 2. Such negotiations culminated in an agreement on the 
definition of the crime of aggression at the Kampala Conference in 2010, but the earliest 
that the ICC can take jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is 2017. Michael P. Scharf, 
Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 362–65 
(2012) (describing the Kampala negotiations). 
103 John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser to the Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Remarks at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: U.S. Perspectives on International 
Criminal Justice (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal    
-courts-and-tribunals/bellingers-speech-international-criminal-justice/p17777 (“Indeed, the 
United States recognizes that international criminal tribunals, in the right circumstances, 
play a key role in ensuring accountability for those who commit war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity.”). 
104 Id. (noting that the United States had “long [been] a proponent of the idea of a 
permanent international criminal court”). 
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there is a strong symbolic and substantive value in the existence of an 
international institution tasked with investigating and, where 
appropriate, prosecuting those responsible for human rights atrocities 
when no national government is willing or able to do so. And explicit 
U.S. support for the ICC would lend its mission both the prestige and 
resources of the world’s greatest military and economic power. 
The Bounded Pluralism approach thus seeks to honor the robust 
American commitment to due process while recognizing the strong 
normative values associated with tribal and international criminal 
jurisdiction. This balanced approach can be achieved by accepting the 
functional jurisdiction of tribes and of the ICC while demanding 
supervisory jurisdiction over those processes. Of course, Bounded 
Pluralism also represents a compromise position between 
Sovereigntism, Internationalism, and Pluralism. It is Sovereigntist in 
its demand for supervisory jurisdiction, Internationalist in its 
openness to participation in the ICC, and Pluralist in its commitment 
to tribal self-government. 
In the next two Parts, I will lay out in more detail what a Bounded 
Pluralism approach would suggest for both tribal criminal justice and 
international criminal jurisdiction, respectively. 
III 
THE CHALLENGE FROM BELOW—TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
In this Part, I argue that criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands already 
reflects major elements of the Bounded Pluralism approach I support, 
but that criminal justice in Indian Country could be improved if tribes 
had greater functional jurisdiction and if the federal government had 
greater supervisory authority to set fundamental-rights constraints on 
that jurisdiction. 
A. The Status Quo of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country 
American Indian tribes are unique entities in American law and 
governance. Often described as “dependent sovereigns,” tribes have a 
semiautonomous self-governing status recognized by the federal 
government as distinct from any other sub-state actors and distinct 
from the states of the Union.105 The exact contours of tribal power 
	
105 See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 203 (referring to Indian tribes as “dependent 
sovereign[s]”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886) (“They were, and 
always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved 
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of 
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(“sovereignty”) have been in dispute for as long as the United States 
has existed, and it is no surprise that criminal justice—that area of the 
law so long associated with sovereignty and territorial control—
would be a prime battleground over which tribes, the states, and the 
federal government would fight incessantly.106 The result of that long 
struggle has been the regrettable “maze” of criminal jurisdiction that 
exists in tribal lands today.107 
Perhaps the clearest place to begin describing tribal criminal 
jurisdiction is to explain who and what is not subject to tribal criminal 
jurisdiction. Under current statutes and precedent, tribes have no 
criminal jurisdiction at all over non-Indians.108 Tribes cannot 
prescribe criminal rules for non-Indians, and thus cannot enforce or 
adjudicate criminal cases against non-Indians. When a non-Indian 
commits a crime on tribal land, either state or federal law applies.109 
This means that tribes, unlike American states or other nation-states, 
are powerless to use criminal law to regulate the behavior of non-
Indians on their “sovereign” tribal land. And it means that non-
Indians on tribal land are subject to federal and state criminal 
jurisdiction, but not directly to tribal jurisdiction. 
	
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose 
limits they resided.”). 
106 FORD, supra note 15, at 2–3 (describing how the assertion of criminal jurisdiction 
became the “crucible[]” in which colonial settlers and indigenous people clashed and 
fought over sovereignty and territory). 
107 See, e.g., DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 483 (6th ed. 2011) (referring to the “jurisdictional maze” of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey 
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976). 
108 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding that tribes 
have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). 
109 Pursuant to the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006), when a non-Indian 
commits a crime against an Indian in Indian Country, federal criminal law usually applies 
to the exclusion of state or tribal law. See CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 279 (6th ed. 2010) (“Under 
Oliphant, a non-Indian who commits a crime against the person or property of an Indian 
victim must be tried in federal court generally under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (unless a federal 
statute, such as Public Law 280, has granted the state jurisdiction over crimes occurring on 
reservations).”). And when a non-Indian commits a crime against another non-Indian—or 
commits a victimless crime—in Indian Country, state criminal law usually applies to the 
exclusion of federal or tribal law. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 196–97 (5th ed. 2009). 
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Indians on tribal land are subject to both federal law and tribal 
law110 and, in some cases, state law as well. Jurisdiction over crimes 
by Indians depends on who the victim is and on the nature of the 
crime.111 First, the Major Crimes Act grants the federal government 
direct jurisdiction to punish fifteen specific felonies if committed by 
an Indian in Indian Country, regardless of who the victim is.112 The 
crimes listed in the Major Crimes Act are the most serious felonies in 
most criminal justice systems, including murder, manslaughter, 
kidnapping, felony child abuse, arson, burglary, and robbery.113 
Second, an Indian defendant is subject to all federal criminal laws 
applicable within federal enclaves.114 In practice, this means that 
specific federal criminal statutes applicable in federal enclaves—e.g., 
receiving stolen property115—apply to Indians on tribal lands if the 
victim of the crime is a non-Indian. Moreover, through the 
Assimilative Crimes Act, substantive state criminal law may be 
incorporated by reference into federal criminal law in federal 
enclaves.116 Thus, when the victim is a non-Indian, Indians may be 
subject to state substantive criminal law as assimilated into federal 
criminal law pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act.117 
Finally, Indian tribes maintain their own full-spectrum criminal 
jurisdiction to create and punish crimes by Indians on tribal lands, and 
such jurisdiction exists in addition to any overlapping federal or state 
jurisdiction.118 For crimes not covered by the Major Crimes Act, 
	
110 See CANBY, supra note 109, at 199–200. 
111 Id. 
112 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. § 1152. 
115 Id. § 662. 
116 Id. § 13. 
117 To be clear, the Assimilative Crimes Act does not grant states any criminal 
jurisdiction over Indians; rather, it incorporates substantive state criminal law into pre-
existing federal jurisdiction over Indians. See id.; Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 742 n.5 
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Assimilative Crimes Act, inter alia, does 
“not confer any regulatory or enforcement jurisdiction on the States”). 
118 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197, 204 (2004) (reiterating that power of a 
tribe to criminally prosecute its own members is “inherent”); United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978) (“[A]n Indian tribe’s power to punish tribal offenders is part of 
its own retained sovereignty . . . .”); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“That the tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the Major Crimes Act is the 
conclusion already reached by distinguished authorities on the subject.”); COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (“As 
sovereigns, tribes possess the power to exercise at least concurrent jurisdiction over all 
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where the victim is Indian, Indians are thus subject to exclusive tribal 
jurisdiction.119 However, tribal criminal jurisdiction is severely 
limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act which, among other things, sets 
a general cap of a one-year prison sentence and $5,000 fine on the 
punishment available for any single criminal offense under tribal 
jurisdiction.120 In essence, this means that Indian criminal jurisdiction 
is limited to misdemeanor-level offenses because no matter how 
profound the evil, a tribal criminal justice system cannot imprison an 
offender beyond a year for any one crime. 
The upshot of this “crazy quilt”121 of criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Territory is this: despite the rhetoric of sovereignty, tribes have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and they have only very 
limited functional jurisdiction over Indians—essentially 
misdemeanor-level jurisdiction. But within that small jurisdictional 
ambit, tribes enjoy legislative, executive, and judicial jurisdiction 
arguably greater than that of states because tribes are not subject to 
federal constitutional limits. The rights enumerated in the 
Constitution apply to states and to the federal government, but not to 
tribal governments.122 Tribal sovereignty is understood to be extra-
constitutional (or pre-constitutional) insofar as the adoption of the 
Constitution did not affect a change in the status of tribes as 
sovereigns apart from the states and federal government.123 This lack 
of constitutional accountability comes as a surprise to many 
	
crimes committed by an Indian against the person or property of another Indian in Indian 
country.”). 
119 See CANBY, supra note 109, at 200; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (excepting “offenses 
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian” from the 
General Crimes Act). 
120 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (Supp. IV 2011). 
121 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (using the phrase 
“unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt” in reference to a civil jurisdiction issue in Indian 
Country); Janine Robben, Life in Indian Country: How the Knot of Criminal Jurisdiction 
Is Strangling Community Safety, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 2012, at 29, 29 (quoting Professor 
Robert James Miller of Lewis & Clark Law School as describing criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country as “a crazy quilt of jurisdiction”); Tim Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in 
Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants’ Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 387, 387 (1974) (describing criminal enforcement in Indian Country as a 
“jurisdictional crazy-quilt”). 
122 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns 
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by 
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state 
authority.”). 
123 Id. 
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unfamiliar with Indian law, and it is both symbolically and doctrinally 
significant. Symbolically, it affirms the independence of Indian tribes: 
they are not agents of the state or federal government, and they are 
not creatures of the Constitution. Doctrinally, it means that tribes are 
simply not susceptible to suit or challenge for violations of 
constitutional rights.124 
On the other hand, of course, tribes are not free from federal 
control. Congress’s plenary power to directly legislate on tribal 
matters has been clearly upheld time and again.125 And in order to 
ensure that tribal governments act within the bounds of basic 
constitutional norms, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (ICRA).126 ICRA imposes by statute most, though not all, of the 
Bill of Rights provisions on Indian tribes.127 For instance, ICRA has 
provisions directed at tribes analogous to the Free Exercise Clause, 
the Free Speech Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Speedy Trial Clause, and 
the Equal Protection Clause, among others.128 In the realm of 
criminal justice, one notable difference between the U.S. Constitution 
and ICRA is that the latter grants a defendant a right to counsel only 
“at his own expense” while the federal constitutional right to counsel 
includes the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants.129 
Despite the Bill of Rights-like list of rights that ICRA guarantees, 
there is in fact only one way for an individual to secure federal review 
of alleged tribal violations of ICRA: the provision of ICRA allowing 
for habeas review of any person detained by a tribal justice system.130 
The Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez that tribes 
	
124 Id. at 56, 58 (noting that “Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the 
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers”). 
125 Id. at 56 (“As the Court in Talton [v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)] recognized, 
however, Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local 
self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.”). 
126 Id. at 57 (“In 25 U. S. C. § 1302 [ICRA], Congress acted to modify the effect of 
Talton and its progeny by imposing certain restrictions upon tribal governments similar, 
but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
127 Id. 
128 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1), (3), (4), (6), (8) (Supp. 2011). 
129 Compare id. § 1302(a)(6) (conferring right “at his own expense to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense”), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 
(1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel to indigent 
defendants as well as to those who can afford an attorney). 
130 Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 70 (holding that ICRA “authorize[s] federal judicial review 
of tribal actions only through the habeas corpus provisions”). 
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enjoy sovereign immunity from suit and that, apart from the habeas 
provision, ICRA does not create any rights of action in federal 
court.131 Both ICRA and Santa Clara elicited controversy. 
Predictably, tribal advocates who protested ICRA as an unwarranted 
intrusion of federal law into tribal matters hailed Santa Clara as 
respecting tribal sovereignty, and those who supported ICRA feared 
that Santa Clara left tribes too unaccountable.132 
In the realm of criminal jurisdiction, ICRA does provide habeas as 
a means for challenging tribal action that leads to detention in federal 
court.133 Habeas is, of course, a very narrow and usually unsuccessful 
means for challenging one’s detention.134 One must be in “detention 
by order of an Indian tribe” to bring a habeas petition, one must 
exhaust tribal remedies first, and one must show that one’s detention 
is in violation of federal law.135 In the usual habeas case brought by a 
	
131 Id. 
132 Compare Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through 
Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 
28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 271–72 (1997) (“Thus, under the guise of 
strengthening tribal governance, Congress further imposed the Anglo-American legal 
tradition on the Indian nations through the ICRA and continued its 100-year attack on 
traditional methods of governance and dispute resolution.”), with Carla Christofferson, 
Note, Tribal Courts’ Failure to Protect Native American Women: A Reevalutation of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 170 (1991) (“This Note argues that an 
expansion of the ICRA is necessary to protect Native American women from 
discriminatory actions by their tribes.”). See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, supra note 118, § 14.04[2] (“ICRA has engendered considerable 
controversy, both from those who believe it went too far and those who believe it did not 
go far enough in constraining tribal actions.”); Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil 
Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law 
Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 508–09 (1994) (describing the debate between those 
who privilege individual rights over tribal sovereignty and vice versa). 
133 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006). 
134 Research by Nancy King has revealed that the overall success rate of non-capital 
habeas corpus cases in federal court is approximately 0.8%. Nancy J. King, Non-Capital 
Habeas Cases after Appellate Review: An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308, 
310 (2012); see also Mary Swift, Banishing Habeas Jurisdiction: Why Federal Courts 
Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Tribal Banishment Actions, 86 WASH. L. REV. 941, 974 (2011) 
(“Against this historical backdrop, Congress considered and rejected several proposals for 
expansive federal jurisdiction to review tribal court decisions. Instead, Congress 
deliberately chose the narrow habeas remedy, which limits federal intrusion into tribal 
affairs.” (footnote omitted)). 
135 25 U.S.C. § 1303; see also Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 
874, 890–93 (2d Cir. 1996) (construing “detention” requirement of ICRA as congruent in 
scope with the “in custody” requirements of federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Tribe 
members who seek to challenge their tribal detention in federal court via habeas corpus 
usually must exhaust tribal remedies first, though non-members are not necessarily 
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state prisoner, the prisoner-petitioner alleges that the state violated the 
federal Constitution in convicting or detaining him.136 An Indian 
prisoner bringing a habeas claim against tribal detention, however, 
cannot allege a federal constitutional violation because the 
Constitution does not apply directly to the actions of the tribe.137 The 
Indian habeas petitioner, thus, must argue that his detention violates 
ICRA or another federal statute.138 Although many of the individual 
rights provisions in ICRA are substantively similar to federal 
constitutional rights,139 tribal action is not formally subject to 
constitutional review even in habeas, but only to statutory review.140 
Utilizing the concepts of functional and supervisory jurisdiction 
helps us see how criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country operates 
systemically. On the functional side, the federal government has 
seized the bulk of the functions—legislative, enforcement, and 
adjudicatory—normally associated with a criminal justice regime. 
Through the Major Crimes Act, it subjects Indians to direct federal 
jurisdiction for the most serious antisocial crimes, such as murder, 
robbery, and dangerous assault.141 And through the penalty limits of 
ICRA, the federal government has taken out of Indian jurisdiction 
crimes serious enough to warrant more than a year in prison or more 
than a $5,000 fine.142 What is left to functional tribal jurisdiction is 
legislative, executive, and judicial jurisdiction over misdemeanor-
	
required to do so. See Selam v. Warm Springs Tribal Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 953–54 
(9th Cir. 1998) (discussing the basis for the exhaustion doctrine and when exhaustion will 
be required). 
136 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, 
or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”). 
137 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns 
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by 
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state 
authority.”). 
138 Eric Wolpin, Answering Lara’s Call: May Congress Place Nonmember Indians 
Within Tribal Jurisdiction Without Running Afoul of Equal Protection or Due Process 
Requirements?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1086 (2006) (“[A]n individual seeking to 
assert a violation of individual rights by tribal actors must typically pursue that claim as 
violation of rights provided by the ICRA (in the form of a habeas petition) and not as a 
claim of a violation of constitutional rights.”). 
139 Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 57 (holding that ICRA imposes “restrictions upon tribal 
governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
140 Wolpin, supra note 138, at 1086. 
141 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
142 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 2011). 
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level crimes.143 However, within that small ambit of functional 
jurisdiction left to tribes, there are only minimal boundaries from 
outside the system. Strictly speaking, there are no federal 
constitutional limits because the U.S. Constitution has been held not 
to apply to the actions of tribal governments.144 But there are the 
quasi-constitutional bounds of the ICRA.145 ICRA, however, provides 
only a single remedy—habeas relief if the prisoner is being detained 
in violation of ICRA itself or other federal statutes.146 In short, tribes 
have a very small ambit of functional jurisdiction, indicating a 
relatively low level of autonomy, but they also enjoy few supervisory 
constraints within that ambit of jurisdiction, indicating a high level of 
autonomy. The current arrangement—for all its problems—illustrates 
the viability of a “limited autonomy” criminal regime. And, crucially 
for reform purposes, tribes enjoy full-spectrum functional jurisdiction, 
which means that they have (at least nascent) institutions charged 
with carrying out all of the major functions of a criminal justice 
regime—legislatures, law enforcement agencies, and courts. 
B. Tribal Jurisdiction: Where Do We Go From Here? 
For the most part, tribes and their advocates seek much greater 
tribal autonomy in the criminal realm than they currently have. They 
want to enlarge their jurisdiction to a wider purview of substantive 
crimes, to a wider range of sentencing options, and to include non-
	
143 Id. (restricting tribal criminal jurisdiction to offenses carrying a maximum penalty 
of one year and $5000 fine); see also Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court 
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of 
Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553, 563 (2009) (“So, under Oliphant, the Duro Fix, and the 
federal statutory scheme, tribal court criminal jurisdiction is restricted to misdemeanor 
crimes committed by Indians in Indian country.”). 
144 Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56. 
145 Id. at 57 (holding that ICRA imposes “restrictions upon tribal governments similar, 
but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
146 Id. at 70 (holding that ICRA “authorize[s] federal judicial review of tribal actions 
only through the habeas corpus provisions”). It should be emphasized that habeas is the 
only practical means by which the federal government exerts supervisory control over the 
actions of those areas of criminal justice under tribal jurisdiction. Defendants in tribal 
court do not, for instance, have an appeal right to a non-Indian court. Nor can the federal 
government enjoin the workings of the tribal court system. The remedy of habeas is simply 
release of the successful petitioner from tribal detention, not any personal or group liability 
of the tribe or its officials. Habeas is thus a very indirect and very infrequent check on the 
activities of the tribal criminal justice system. 
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Indians who commit antisocial acts on tribal lands.147 Waving the flag 
of sovereignty, tribal advocates criticize the functional limits on tribal 
jurisdiction, as well as the (limited) federal habeas review available to 
defendants convicted in tribal courts.148 What tribal advocates and 
their Pluralist supporters want, in short, is the full-spectrum, 
exclusive, unbounded jurisdiction traditionally associated with nation-
state sovereignty. On the other hand, Sovereigntist critics of tribal 
jurisdiction find the jurisdiction already in tribal hands deeply 
troubling, and they reject all attempts to expand such jurisdiction, 
especially over non-Indians.149 
The problems with the current arrangement of criminal jurisdiction 
in Indian Country are, indeed, numerous and well-documented.150 
Tribal jurisdiction is so functionally limited that tribes have not been 
incentivized to build up suitably professional and functional criminal 
justice institutions of their own.151 Tribes have very little reason to 
	
147 See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 845–55 (2006) (arguing that significant expansion of 
tribal criminal authority is necessary to achieve true tribal self-government); National 
Congress of American Indians, The Proposed “Tribal Governance and Economic 
Enhancement Act” (Nov. 11, 2002) (draft legislation), available at http://www.citizens 
alliance.org/links/pages/fact%20sheets/Senate%20Hearing-7-30-03%20TGEEI-2.doc (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2013) (providing draft legislation that would grant tribes full criminal 
jurisdiction over members and non-members within tribal territory). 
148 Porter, supra note 132, at 271–72 (“Thus, under the guise of strengthening tribal 
governance, Congress further imposed the Anglo-American legal tradition on the Indian 
nations through the ICRA and continued its 100-year attack on traditional methods of 
governance and dispute resolution.”). 
149 See, e.g., A Threat to Indian Sovereignty, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/21/opinion/a-threat-to-indian-sovereignty.html 
(criticizing then-Senator Slade Gorton’s proposed legislation to strip tribes of sovereign 
immunity). 
150 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 12, at 140–49 (“The high levels of gang and domestic 
violence in Indian Country are topics receiving an unusually large amount of attention 
recently, both in Washington and in the mass media. For example, Attorney General Eric 
Holder recently stated that ‘in many parts of the Indian country, the situation is dire. 
Violent crime has reached crisis proportions on many reservations.’” (footnotes omitted)); 
Andrea L. Johnson, Note, A Perfect Storm: The U.S. Anti-Trafficking Regime’s Failure to 
Stop the Sex Trafficking of American Indian Women and Girls, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 617, 679 (2012) (“Extremely limited policing resources and the unwillingness or 
inability of tribal, state, and federal law enforcement to assume jurisdiction over sex 
trafficking crimes not only leaves American Indian victims with even fewer chances of 
receiving law enforcement protection, it increases their risk of being trafficked.”); N. 
Bruce Duthu, Op-Ed., Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, at 
A17. 
151 See Maire Corcoran, Note, Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Jurisdiction of Rape, the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, and the Struggle for Tribal Self-Determination, 15 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 415, 421 (2009) (“The degree to which ICRA has rendered tribes 
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invest resources and manpower in their criminal justice systems when 
those systems can do little more than prosecute misdemeanor-level 
offenses. On the other end, largely because the tribes are peripheral to 
the larger concerns of the federal courts and prosecutors, the federal 
government has also failed to invest the resources necessary to 
provide adequate criminal justice where it has exclusive 
jurisdiction.152 In particular, federal law enforcement agencies and 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices have a poor record of investigating and 
prosecuting serious crimes in Indian Country, precisely those crimes 
over which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction.153 This 
	
impotent to handle rape in particular, and crime in general, is perhaps one of the reasons 
why ‘tribes have never developed the law enforcement resources to prosecute and punish 
serious crimes . . . .’”); Matthew Handler, Note, Tribal Law and Disorder: A Look at a 
System of Broken Justice in Indian Country and the Steps Needed to Fix It, 75 BROOK. L. 
REV. 261, 281 (2009) (“[D]ue to restraints in criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and 
the limited resources in Indian country, tribally funded departments remain the least 
common and least robust form of law enforcement within tribal lands.”). The development 
of criminal enforcement capacity has been particularly hampered in Public Law 280 states 
where states have been granted criminal jurisdiction over Indians on tribal land by statute. 
See Jacqueline P. Hand & David C. Koelsch, Shared Experiences, Divergent Outcomes: 
American Indian and Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 25 WIS. J. L. GENDER & 
SOC’Y 185, 198 (2010) (“The enactment of Public Law 280 has had the naive consequence 
of discouraging the development of tribal legal institutions, including courts and police 
forces despite the fact that it did not inhibit tribal jurisdiction over Indians.”). 
152 A Department of Justice study from 2006 revealed that federal prosecutors brought 
only 606 criminal cases that year in all of Indian Country, a shockingly low figure. Duthu, 
supra note 150, at A17; see also Hart, supra note 12, at 149 (“One of the primary culprits 
of the high rates of crime in Indian Country is the ‘complex patchwork of federal, state, 
and tribal law’ and criminal jurisdiction that allows many perpetrators—particularly non-
Indians—to go unprosecuted. Many Native Americans must rely upon federal prosecutors, 
who are often hundreds of miles away, to prosecute even minor crimes. Not surprisingly, 
this leaves many offenses, even very serious ones, unprosecuted.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Johnson, supra note 150, at 703 (“Taking jurisdiction away from tribal authorities and 
failing to fill the void with federal or state law enforcement or prosecutorial resources is in 
direct breach of this responsibility. More fundamentally, a 50% prosecution decline-rate 
for Indian Country crimes—in the face of some of the highest crime rates in the nation—
suggests that the federal government is treating American Indian victims as second-class 
citizens. When it comes to a law of nationwide applicability, like the TVPA, there is no 
excuse for a disproportionate failure to prosecute on tribal land.”). 
153 CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL 
AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 162 (1997) (“In practical application, federal law enforcement 
agents, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
have demonstrated a history of declining to investigate or prosecute violations of the 
Major Crimes Act.”); Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: 
Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2187, 2188 (2000) (“[M]any 
United States Attorneys have abdicated their responsibility to prosecute crimes in Indian 
country committed by non-Indians.”); Matthew L.M. Fletches, ICT on Tribal Law and 
Order Act, TURTLE TALK (Apr. 16, 2009, 10:56 PM), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009 
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means that adequate criminal justice is neither delivered by the tribe, 
nor by the federal government. The political entity with the greatest 
interest in providing criminal justice for its members (the tribe) is 
hamstrung by federal incursion, and the political entity with 
jurisdiction to prosecute and adjudicate the most serious crimes in 
Indian Country (the federal government) has other pressing priorities. 
Thus, the particular allocation of functions between sub-state and 
nation-state operating in Indian Country is producing deplorable 
results.154 
There are also significant problems with the extent to which tribal 
criminal jurisdiction is bound by fundamental due process standards. 
The activities of Indian tribes are not formally subject to the Bill of 
Rights, which contains the key American procedural protections 
afforded criminal suspects and defendants.155 As noted, the tribes are 
subject to ICRA, which provides a similar—though not identical—set 
of rights.156 And the sole mechanism for an individual tribe member 
to vindicate his or her ICRA-derived rights against the tribe in federal 
court is through a habeas proceeding, which can occur only if the 
individual is in tribal custody.157 The imposition of ICRA’s quasi-
constitutional standards on the operation of tribal jurisdiction is 
understandably controversial.158 There is no doubt that ICRA limits 
tribal jurisdiction. But criticism that it infringes on the tribe’s 
“sovereignty” betrays the same archaic commitment to the traditional 
Holy Trinity of sovereignty, territory, and jurisdiction that underlies 
	
/04/16/ict-on-tribal-law-and-order-act/ (“Between 2004 and 2007, the United States 
declined to prosecute 62 percent of Indian country criminal cases referred to federal 
prosecutors, including 72 percent of child sexual crimes and 75 percent of adult rape 
cases.”). 
154 Cf. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, The Emerging Problem of Methamphetamine: A Threat 
Signaling the Need to Reform Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 82 N.D. L. REV. 
1249, 1251 (2006) (“[T]he failure of the federal criminal justice system in Indian country 
is a result of the ineffective criminal jurisdictional scheme created by the Major Crimes 
Act (MCA), the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.” (footnotes omitted)). 
155 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). 
156 Id. at 57 (holding that ICRA imposes “restrictions upon tribal governments similar, 
but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
157 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 118, § 14.04[2] (noting 
that the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez “interpreted ICRA to limit 
federal court enforcement to habeas corpus jurisdiction over claims by persons in tribal 
custody”). 
158 Id. (“ICRA has engendered considerable controversy, both from those who believe 
it went too far and those who believe it did not go far enough in constraining tribal 
actions.”). 
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the Sovereigntist criticism of tribal jurisdiction itself. Any system of 
overlapping criminal jurisdiction is impossible if one accepts the 
traditional model of exclusive national jurisdiction. Tribal advocates 
who argue that sovereignty necessarily entails exclusive and 
unreviewable criminal jurisdiction for tribes are buying into the same 
outdated model as those who deny the possibility of any tribal 
jurisdiction at all. The very existence of Indian jurisdiction, 
functionally limited and bound as it is, demonstrates that criminal 
jurisdiction need not be exclusive in the traditional manner. 
Contrary to the protestations of some tribal advocates, the problem 
with the current amount of federal review over tribal jurisdiction is 
not that there is too much; there is too little. American Indians today 
are American citizens as well as tribal members,159 and the criminal 
regime they live under recognizes that dual identity in its functional 
pluralism. However, the meager federal review available to 
defendants in tribal courts does not accord with individual 
defendants’ expectations as American citizens to baseline procedural 
protections in criminal matters. To say that individual Indians have 
such due process rights against state governments and against the 
federal government, but not against tribal governments, may be 
doctrinally correct.160 But it is not normatively supportable. The 
reason to protect the fundamental rights of criminal defendants in 
state and federal courts applies with equal force to criminal 
defendants in tribal courts: they risk coercive criminal punishment. 
Such punishment should be allowed only after a fundamentally fair 
process. The review system established by ICRA provides a second-
class version of federal fundamental rights review; it does not directly 
impose constitutional constraints on the tribes, it does not include the 
same right-to-counsel doctrine as the U.S. Constitution, and it 
provides habeas as the sole remedy for unlawful tribal action.161 As 
	
159 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW, supra note 118, § 14.01[1] (noting that before the 1924 Act, which explicitly 
conferred U.S. citizenship on native-born Indians, “the prevailing non-Indian view held 
tribal affiliation to be inconsistent with United States and state citizenship as a matter of 
policy”). 
160 Thanks to the citizenship provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, Indians are 
citizens of their state of residence by virtue of their national citizenship. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”). 
161 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (Supp. 2011) (conferring right “at his own expense to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 
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American citizens, Indians deserve full and formal constitutional 
protection when subject to criminal jurisdiction, not the second-class 
statutory protection they have today. 
In fact, the perceived legitimacy of tribal jurisdiction—among 
Indians and non-Indians—would increase, not decrease, if criminal 
proceedings by tribes were subject to greater fundamental rights 
review by federal courts. As it is, even defenders of tribal jurisdiction 
admit that there are too many violations of fundamental rights 
committed by tribal law enforcement and tribal courts.162 Indeed, the 
reality and perception that tribal justice is too often unreliable, unfair, 
and immune to fundamental rights review undermines confidence in 
the tribe’s jurisdiction—and makes widening the functional 
jurisdiction of tribes an uphill climb.163 Subjecting tribal criminal 
jurisdiction to the same level of federal review that state criminal 
justice systems currently face would go a long way toward 
ameliorating perceptions of tribal criminal justice. Direct application 
of federal constitutional standards would not, of course, magically 
solve all of the resource and professionalism problems of tribal 
criminal justice.164 And it might marginally increase the friction 
between tribes and the federal government, just as federal oversight of 
state criminal justice systems engenders tension. But the dialectic of 
federalism could have the same creative force in the federal-Indian 
relationship that it has in federal-state relations.165 
Crucially, regularized federal review would allow tribes to 
advocate for greater functional jurisdiction as part of a Grand Bargain 
with the federal government: more functional jurisdiction in exchange 
for greater fundamental rights protection. The 2010 Tribal Law and 
Order Act (TLOA) constituted an important and promising step in the 
	
70 (1978) (holding that ICRA “authorize[s] federal judicial review of tribal actions only 
through the habeas corpus provisions”). 
162 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 71–74 
(1991) (noting that the most significant impediment to securing the rights codified in 
ICRA was lack of funding and resources for tribal justice systems); cf. Robert J. 
McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 
IDAHO L. REV. 465, 513–15 (1998) (noting that most tribal defendants cannot afford 
defense counsel, but finding that tribal courts have generally done a fine job in vindicating 
the rights codified in ICRA). 
163 See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 162, at 72 (noting that 
legitimacy of tribal justice system suffers because of its current inadequacy). 
164 See, e.g., id. at 71–74 (noting that the most significant impediment to securing the 
rights codified in ICRA was lack of funding and resources for tribal justice systems). 
165 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
WOLITZ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/2013  9:23 AM 
2013] Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: 767 
Toward Bounded Pluralism 
direction of such a Grand Bargain.166 Among its many provisions, 
TLOA amended ICRA to allow tribes to impose imprisonment of up 
to three years per offense (up to nine years of total incarceration per 
case) and fines of up to $15,000.167 But these new and increased 
penalties are available only if, among other conditions, the tribe 
“provide[s] to the defendant the right to effective assistance of 
counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution” and “at the expense of the tribal government, provide[s] 
an indigent defendant the assistance of a defense attorney licensed to 
practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States.”168 In short, the 
TLOA jurisdictional provision adopts the basic form of the Grand 
Bargain: greater functional jurisdiction in exchange for greater 
fundamental rights protection. A May 30, 2012, report from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that, to date, no 
tribes out of 109 surveyed had put the new enhanced sentencing 
provisions into effect, with many tribes reporting “challenges to 
exercising this authority due to funding limitations.”169 Still, over a 
third of the tribes surveyed indicated that they intend to make use of 
the new authority and enact the concomitant protections embodied in 
TLOA.170 So, two years after its passage, it remains to be seen 
whether the TLOA amendments will prove effective. Nevertheless, 
these provisions mark a significant step in the right direction.171 
	
166 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); see also Statement from Mich. 
State Univ. Coll. of Law Indigenous Law & Policy Ctr., Tribal Law and Order Act (Nov. 
10, 2011), available at http://www.indianlawandordercommission.com/featured                 
-commentary/?p=5 (assessing the Act and arguing, inter alia, that “the Tribal Law and 
Order Act is a necessary first step for the restoration of general tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian country”). 
167 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D) (Supp. 2011). 
168 Id. at § 1302(c)(1)–(2). 
169 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER 
ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING 
AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY 
FOR CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 3 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO     
-12-658R. 
170 Id. 
171 In addition, the fact that tribal criminal jurisdiction includes legislative, executive, 
and judicial functions—however meager—means that tribal criminal justice systems have, 
or are building, institutions to cover the full range of criminal justice functions. This is 
ideal for a criminal justice system aiming to expand its functional jurisdiction, as it allows 
institutions to grow and experiment first when the stakes are relatively low and build up 
capacity for a time when the stakes are higher—i.e., when such justice systems have more 
significant jurisdiction. 
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IV 
THE CHALLENGE FROM ABOVE—INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION 
It would be easy to tell a story in which the United States plays the 
role of adversary-in-chief to the whole project of international 
criminal law. The United States refuses to join the ICC, refuses to join 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,172 and even withdrew 
from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations to avoid the embarrassment of repeated failures to notify 
consulates of foreign criminal defendants.173 Indeed, the United 
States is often criticized not just for its aversion to international 
criminal law, but in some cases, for allegedly violating international 
criminal law itself.174 In this narrative, the United States is a country 
fiercely resisting claims of supra-national criminal jurisdiction. But 
one could just as easily portray the United States as the most 
important state promoter of international criminal law. The United 
States was an early champion of the codification of war crimes, 
promulgated the first international criminal tribunal, and pushed for 
adoption of human rights conventions in the post-War period.175 
America’s relation to international criminal law is complicated and 
defies a quick sketch. Rather than uniformly opposing all supra-
national claims of criminal jurisdiction, the United States has 
consistently affirmed the prescriptive jurisdiction of international 
criminal law while refusing to allow its own citizens to be subject to 
	
172 See Pamela Stephens, Applying Human Rights Norms to Climate Change: The 
Elusive Remedy, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 82 (2010) (“[T]he failure of the 
United States and Canada to fully participate in the Organization of American States 
(‘OAS’), including their failure to ratify the American Convention and thereby accept the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, weakens the system and leaves 
it without any effective remedy against either country.”). 
173 See Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/politics/10death.html 
(reporting U.S. withdrawal from Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations). 
174 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate 
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 824–38 (2005) (cataloguing U.S. violations of Geneva Convention 
and international human rights law after 9/11); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, 
Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 295, 320 (2007) (arguing that the U.S. government program of “extraordinary 
rendition” violated the Geneva Conventions). 
175 Leila Sadat refers to the apparent U.S. repudiation of its own heritage of promoting 
international criminal law as the “Nuremberg Paradox.” Leila Nadya Sadat, The 
Nuremberg Paradox, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 151 (2010). 
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supra-national enforcement or judicial jurisdiction for alleged 
violations of international criminal law. This position is unlikely to 
change in the near future, but I suggest that the United States is more 
likely to join the ICC if it can maintain supervisory jurisdiction over 
cases where the defendant is an American. 
A. International Criminal Jurisdiction and the United States: The 
Status Quo 
The United States has not always resisted international 
enforcement of international criminal law. Indeed, the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals, largely run by the United States under international 
auspices, are considered the first major supra-national tribunals with 
direct jurisdiction over violations of international criminal law.176 
After World War II and throughout the Cold War, the United States 
supported the establishment of a more permanent international 
criminal tribunal to enforce international criminal law.177 But when 
serious negotiations aimed at establishing just such a court finally 
took place in the mid-1990s and resulted in adoption of the Rome 
Statute in 1998, the United States balked.178 The United States voted 
against the final accord, and though President Clinton decided to sign 
the Rome Statute on the last possible day, he refused to submit the 
treaty to ratification and even advised his successor against its 
adoption.179 The Bush Administration proved even more hostile to 
the Rome Statute, effectively removing the United States from the 
treaty by sending notice to The Hague that it did not accept even 
signatory-level responsibilities to the ICC.180 Congress subsequently 
passed, and President Bush signed, the American Service-Members 
Protection Act (ASPA), colloquially known as the “Invade the 
Hague” Act, which aimed to curtail or prohibit U.S. cooperation with 
the ICC.181 Among other provisions, ASPA prohibited states and the 
	
176 CASSESE, supra note 16, at 329–33 (describing the post–World War II international 
tribunals). 
177 Bellinger, supra note 103 (noting that the United States was “long a proponent of 
the idea of a permanent international criminal court”). 
178 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 65, at 9–11 (detailing United States resistance and 
rejection of the ICC). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See, e.g., L. Rush Atkinson, Knights of the Court: The State Coalition Behind the 
International Criminal Court, J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL., Fall 2011, at 66, 92 n.154 (citing 
“the infamous ‘Invade the Hague clause’ of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
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federal government from extraditing defendants to the ICC, cut off 
aid to countries that did not sign bilateral agreements immunizing 
U.S. citizens from extradition to the ICC, and conditioned U.S. 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities on immunity for U.S. 
peacekeepers.182 
How did the United States, the country that practically invented the 
international tribunal after World War II, come to be the ICC’s chief 
critic and adversary? The short answer is that the United States of the 
post–Cold War Era—the “world’s sole remaining superpower”183—
found itself as both the chief promoter of liberal internationalism and 
its chief target. The United States projected military force around the 
world—in some cases, at least, to vindicate humanitarian values. But 
these very force projections exposed the United States to more 
international hostility and its citizens to more vulnerability to 
international crime allegations than any other country. The United 
States thus worried that an international criminal court, like other 
international organizations, would be susceptible to anti-American 
	
(ASPA)”); U.S.:”Hague Invasion Act” Becomes Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 4, 2002), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law. 
182 Many commentators have noted a softening in the United States stance toward the 
ICC in recent years. See, e.g., Megan A. Fairlie, The United States and the International 
Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 528, 529 (2011) (“Now, just over two years into the Obama 
presidency, the world has witnessed renewed and significant U.S. engagement with the 
Court.”); Prashant Sabharwal, Manifest Destiny: The Relationship Between the United 
States and the International Criminal Court in a Time of International Upheaval, 18 NEW 
ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 311, 312 (2012) (noting that a “softening” in the U.S. attitude 
toward the ICC began in the latter half of the Bush Administration and has accelerated 
during the Obama Administration). The economic and foreign aid sanctions of ASPA and 
associated legislation have lapsed. See Congress and the ICC, AMICC, http://www.amicc 
.org/usicc/congress/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). The United States approved of the ICC 
investigation of atrocities committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. See David 
H. Lim, Beyond Kampala: The U.S.’ Role in Supporting the International Criminal 
Court’s Mission, 39 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 441, 443–44 (2012). The United States 
also cosponsored and voted in favor of a Security Council resolution referring the situation 
in Libya to the ICC. See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). And the 
United States participated in a number of Assemblies of State Parties reviewing the Rome 
Statute. See Lim, supra, at 460. In 2010, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh 
summed up the evolving relationship thus: “[a]fter 12 years, I think we have reset the 
default on the U.S. relationship with the court from hostility to positive engagement.” 
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on U.S. Engagement 
with the International Criminal Court and the Outcome of the ICC Assembly of States 
Parties Conference (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal 
-courts-and-tribunals/koh-rapps-remarks-us-engagement-international-criminal-court-out 
come-icc-assembly-states-parties-conference-june-2010/p22454. 
183 William H. Taft, IV, Address, A View From the Top: American Perspectives on 
International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 503, 510 (2006). 
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hostility and would possess ample opportunities to brand U.S. 
military interventions or particular military strikes as violations of 
international criminal law.184 Consequently, in the negotiations over 
the creation of the ICC, the United States sought assurances that its 
leaders, soldiers, and officials would not be subject to “politically 
motivated prosecutions before an unaccountable court.”185 The 
primary U.S. negotiating strategy for achieving this end was to 
propose limiting the ICC’s jurisdiction to issues referred to the ICC 
by the U.N. Security Council where the U.S. has a permanent veto.186 
Ultimately, this U.S. position was not adopted by the conference, and 
the final Rome Statute allowed for ICC jurisdiction pursuant to state 
referral and proprio motu investigations in addition to Security 
Council referral.187 This left open the possibility that U.S. nationals 
operating in a State Party—or in a state that accepts issue-specific 
jurisdiction—could come under ICC jurisdiction despite U.S. refusal 
to ratify the Rome Statute. Though the possibility of an American 
ending up in the docks in the Hague was—and remains—quite 
remote, the United States could not go along with an international 
court that, by its own terms and without American ratification, had 
jurisdiction to try Americans for international criminal violations. 
The exact jurisdictional claims and contours of the ICC were the 
subject of extensive debate and negotiation in the run-up to the 
adoption of the Rome Statute.188 What resulted was a compromise 
known as “complementarity.”189 Under the complementarity 
principle, the ICC may initiate prosecution only if no state has proper 
jurisdiction over the alleged crime or the states with jurisdiction are 
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
	
184 Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 89, 95–96 (2003). 
185 Id. at 95. 
186 Id. at 90 (“The United States argued in Rome (the site of the ICC’s founding 
conference) that ICC prosecutions should be . . . limited to cases referred by the Security 
Council.”). 
187 Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 13 (laying out bases of ICC jurisdiction); 
Goldsmith, supra note 184, at 90 (“[T]he prevailing parties in Rome believed that the 
Security Council—and in particular the opportunistic votes of veto-wielding permanent 
members—was part of the problem.”). 
188 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An 
Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 384 (2000) (describing long and “grueling” 
negotiations). 
189 Rome Statute, supra note 45, pmbl., art. 1. 
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prosecution” of the alleged violation.190 Thus, if the ICC determines 
that an alleged violation is already properly under investigation or 
prosecution by a nation-state with preexisting jurisdiction, then the 
ICC will disclaim jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the ICC 
determines that no state is sincerely and effectively exercising its own 
criminal jurisdiction with respect to the alleged violation, then the 
ICC may take jurisdiction. The idea is to give nation-states priority in 
exercising criminal jurisdiction where they already have it, but to 
allow the ICC to serve as a backstop prosecutor and court where no 
nation-state is willing or able to investigate, prosecute, or punish a 
serious violation of international criminal law.191 
Complementarity is not the only jurisdictional provision in the 
Rome Statute. The ICC is limited to investigating, prosecuting, and 
adjudicating only four classes of substantive crimes: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.192 Its 
subject-matter jurisdiction, then, is limited to only the most serious of 
international crimes, the so-called “great crimes” of international 
law.193 ICC jurisdiction is also constrained by the territory on which 
the alleged crime occurred and by the nationality of the alleged 
perpetrator. Any qualifying crime that occurs on the territory of a 
State Party, or a state that avails itself of ICC jurisdiction, is subject to 
ICC jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.194 
And any qualifying crime committed by a national of a State Party is 
also subject to ICC jurisdiction, regardless of the location of the 
crime.195 Finally, if the U.N. Security Council refers an incident to 
the ICC, then there is no territorial or nationality limit on the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.196 
	
190 Id. art. 17, § 1(a). The Statute does not define unwillingness or inability but instead 
directs the Court to consider particular factors for each criterion. Id. art. 17, § 2. 
191 Of course, it is ultimately up to the ICC—not the country in question—whether a 
country is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” Id. 
art. 17, § 1(a). 
192 Id. art. 5. I will refer to these four crimes as “qualifying crimes.” 
193 See David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy 
of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 572 
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010) (referring to crimes against humanity, 
genocide, serious war crimes, and aggressive war as “‘the great crimes’, because they 
represent the very worst atrocities that people commit against each other”). 
194 Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 12, § 2(a). In addition, a state can choose to put 
itself under issue-specific ICC jurisdiction. Id. art. 12, § 3. 
195 Id. art. 12, § 2(b). 
196 There are three ways the ICC may commence investigation and prosecution of 
alleged crimes: (1) state referral of potential crimes, (2) U.N. Security Council referral of 
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The upshot of the jurisdictional scheme is that the ICC can take 
jurisdiction of any alleged crime that (a) occurs on the territory of a 
State Party regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator, (b) is 
committed by a national of a State Party regardless of the location of 
the crime, or (c) is referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council 
regardless of nationality or location. Thus, a citizen of a non-Party—
e.g., an American or a Saudi national—may come under ICC 
jurisdiction if he or she commits a qualifying crime on the territory of 
a State Party or if the case is referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security 
Council. Libya, for instance, is not a member of the ICC, but because 
the Security Council referred to the ICC alleged crimes committed by 
the Gadhafi regime in 2011,197 the ICC asserted jurisdiction and 
subsequently brought charges against Muammar Gadhafi, his son 
Seif-al Islam Gadhafi, and Gadhafi’s intelligence chief Abdullah 
Senusi.198 
A citizen of the United States who remains within the United States 
is effectively immune from ICC jurisdiction because the United States 
is not a State Party and because the United States has a permanent 
veto right within the U.N. Security Council—thus precluding 
prosecution based on a Security Council referral. However, by the 
terms of the Rome Statute, U.S. soldiers or contractors operating on 
the territory of a State Party—e.g., Mexico or Jordan—may be subject 
to ICC jurisdiction.199 Of course, many other factors besides the 
jurisdictional provisions of the Rome Statute make ICC prosecutions 
extremely rare in general—the small budget and limited resources of 
the ICC, political considerations that militate against prosecution, and 
the ICC’s still-fledgling legitimacy.200 These factors weigh especially 
	
potential crimes, or (3) the ICC office of the prosecutor may initiate investigation and 
prosecution on its own (proprio motu). Id. art. 13. Read together, articles 12 and 13 of the 
Rome Statute make clear that U.N. Security Council referrals are not subject to limits 
based on territory or nationality. Id. arts. 12, 13. 
197 See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
198 Marlise Simons, International Court Faces Key Test on Libya Captives, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at A8. 
199 See Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 12, § 2(a). 
200 See Matthew Rushton, Global Justice at a Crossroads, INT’L B. NEWS, Oct. 2009, 
at 14, 17 (“‘The ICC is limited by resources to six to seven cases at a time, and by global 
political-economic realities to cases that can best be handled in a justice context’, says 
Judge Patricia Wald, a former judge on the ICTY.”). In its ten years of operation, the ICC 
has brought a grand total of 30 indictments, resulting in a single conviction. List of People 
Indicted by the International Criminal Court, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List 
_of_people_indicted_in_the_ International_Criminal_Court (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
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heavily against any ICC prosecution of American citizens, for such a 
prosecution would undoubtedly provoke a firestorm of U.S. criticism 
of the ICC. Still, even the remote possibility of American soldiers 
operating abroad facing ICC investigations provoked substantial 
anxiety and furious reactions by the Bush Administration in the mid-
2000s.201 
B. The International Criminal Court and the United States: Where Do 
We Go From Here? 
This recent history explains why it is easy to see the United States 
and international criminal jurisdiction as adversaries. But that would 
be a mistake, and not only because of the recent softening in the U.S. 
tone toward the ICC.202 While it is true that the United States 
continues to reject the executive or judicial jurisdiction of the ICC 
over Americans, the United States has always recognized and 
affirmed the legitimacy of international criminal law as law and 
continues to do so.203 The United States accepts and promotes the 
criminality under international law of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, torture, aggression, piracy, hijacking, and other 
crimes.204 This fact goes unremarked—indeed, almost unnoticed—
because it is so deeply assumed. It would, of course, be a scandal if 
the United States or any other nation-state rejected the legitimacy of 
international criminal law in toto. But it is also remarkable that the 
United States—along with other nation-states—accepts that crimes 
created and defined by institutions and practices at the international 
level qualify as substantive criminal law. As the Supreme Court 
	
201 See Turner, supra note 65, at 10. 
202 See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 182, at 529 (“Now, just over two years into the Obama 
presidency, the world has witnessed renewed and significant U.S. engagement with the 
Court.”); Sabharwal, supra note 182, at 312 (noting that the “softening” began in the latter 
half of the Bush Administration and has accelerated during the Obama Administration). 
203 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 
Nations”); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159–60 (1795) (“[A]ll piracies and 
trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be 
proceeded against, in any nation where no special exemption can be maintained, either by 
the general law of nations, or by some treaty which forbids or restrains it.”). 
204 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 404 (“A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain 
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, 
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain 
acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is 
present.”). 
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famously put it in The Paquette Habana, “[i]nternational law is part 
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of 
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”205 In 
effect, this means that the United States admits that there are 
lawmaking processes outside of its own constitutional structure—at 
the supra-national level no less—that can create “laws of the United 
States.”206 Of course, there is a big debate about exactly how and 
when international law can be enforced by the executive and judicial 
branches within the United States,207 but the essential legitimacy of 
international law as law—including international criminal law—is 
well settled in the United States.208 The United States is emphatically 
not a unilateralist “cowboy” country fundamentally opposed to 
international criminal law. 
Rather, the United States has always embraced international 
criminal law as an important component of world public order and, 
under the Obama Administration, has even supported significant ICC 
	
205 The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
206 See Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100–01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, 
C.J.) (“[I]t may be proper to observe, that the laws of the United States admit of being 
classed under three heads of descriptions. 1st. All treaties made under the authority of the 
United States. 2d. The laws of nations. 3dly. The constitution, and statutes of the United 
States.”). Thus, the United States grants that the international community has real, if 
limited, legislative jurisdiction. 
207 See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
passim (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that customary international law is part of the “law of the 
United States”); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 58 (arguing that customary international 
law is not part of the laws of the United States); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (criticizing Bradley 
& Goldsmith); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International 
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) 
(criticizing Bradley & Goldsmith); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Commentary, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2260 (1998) (responding to Koh). 
208 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES ch. 2, intro. note (1987) (“From the beginning, the law of nations, lator [sic] 
referred to as international law, was considered to be incorporated into the law of the 
United States without the need for any action by Congress or the President, and the courts, 
State and federal, have applied it and given it effect as the courts of England had done.”); 
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 
1555 (1984) (calling status of international law as law “unquestioned today”); see also 
Koh, supra note 182 (describing consistent U.S. “support for policies of accountability, 
international criminal justice, and ending impunity”). 
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investigations and prosecutions.209 But at the same time, as the 
world’s strongest military power, the United States has a legitimate 
concern that an international criminal court composed primarily of 
middling and small powers may be tempted to use the court to harass 
American officials and service-members through politically motivated 
investigations and prosecutions.210 Given the status quo, there is 
practically no way to imagine the United States embracing the ICC 
fully, and even less reason to imagine that the United States will 
become a State Party in the foreseeable future. The best that 
supporters of the court can hope for is opportunistic U.S. cooperation 
with the court when such cooperation furthers U.S. interests and 
values.211 But the basic impasse will remain. 
If supporters of the ICC wish to see the United States fully 
embrace the court, then a different jurisdictional scheme will need to 
be made available. The ICC today claims a very narrow functional 
jurisdiction—by its own terms, its mandate is limited in numerous 
ways (e.g., to only four types of crime and only three modes of case 
initiation).212 However, once the ICC is seized of a case, it operates 
with unbounded discretion. That is to say, its processes are not 
reviewable by some other legal system’s courts or institutions. Of 
course, the court and its processes have been created ex ante by 
nation-states, but there is no ex post review of court procedures or 
verdicts by another legal system. This is, of course, the norm with 
international courts. Countries set up international adjudicatory 
institutions to take certain decisions away from single nation-state 
control, so there would be something paradoxical about subjecting 
	
209 The United States has explicitly supported ICC investigations of atrocities 
committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and voted in favor of the Security 
Council resolution referring the situation in Libya to ICC jurisdiction. See Lim, supra note 
182, at 443; S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
210 See Goldsmith, supra note 184, at 95. 
211 See Fairlie, supra note 182, at 573 (“U.S. membership is unlikely to materialize any 
time soon.”); see also Koh, supra note 182 (describing how “principled engagement” with 
the ICC “can protect and advance our [U.S.] interests” and lead to “a better relationship 
going forward between the U.S. and the ICC”); Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for 
War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on U.S. Engagement with the 
International Criminal Court and the Outcome of the ICC Assembly of States Parties 
Conference, supra note 182 (“[I]t’s clear that joining the court is not on the table, as far as 
a U.S. decision at this time. But as you know, the United States takes a very long time to 
adopt international conventions and treaties, and sometimes doesn’t. I mean, it took us 40 
years to ratify the Genocide Convention. . . . And who knows what the future may hold?”). 
212 Rome Statute, supra note 45, arts. 5, 11, 12, 13. 
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international court decisions to national review.213 Yet that is 
precisely what I propose here. 
Among the consistent themes of those opposed to U.S. 
participation in the ICC is that ICC procedures fail to meet the 
constitutional standards of American criminal courts and that the ICC 
is unaccountable to such standards.214 On this account, Americans 
should not be put in jeopardy by a criminal justice system that lacks 
American due process standards, jury trials, or any mechanism of 
federal review.215 Others argue that the court’s procedures fully 
conform to—or exceed—constitutional due process standards and that 
there would be no constitutional infirmity in its trying American 
defendants.216 But whether the ICC procedures on paper meet 
constitutional standards or not, the fact is that there is no direct 
mechanism for U.S. courts to review ICC procedures for conformity 
to due process standards in any particular case. 
The principle that Americans should not be deprived of life or 
liberty without due process of law suggests not only that ICC 
procedures should conform to fundamental due process standards, but 
also that United States courts ought to have a chance to review ICC 
convictions of American citizens to ensure such conformity. Such 
review could take a number of different procedural forms, but the 
habeas review available to state and tribal prisoners is the most 
relevant and attractive model.217 Under this arrangement, the United 
	
213 One interesting and successful attempt by a nation-state to shape an international 
court to its interests took place during the protracted ratification of Protocol 14 to the 
European Convention of Human Rights, a measure aimed at increasing the efficiency of 
the European Court of Human Rights. See Russia: Ratification of Protocol Promotes 
Justice, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/01/15/russia   
-ratification-protocol-promotes-justice. Russia effectively conditioned its ratification of 
Protocol 14 to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the assurance that a 
Russian judge will always sit on ECHR panels issuing final judgment in cases brought 
against Russia. See Russian Duma Has Accepted Protocol 14 Today, ECHR BLOG       
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/russian-will-ratify-protocol-14         
-today .html. 
214 See, e.g., Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, The International Criminal Court vs. the 
American People, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 5, 1999), http://www.heritage.org/research 
/reports/1999/02/the-international-criminal-court-vs-the-american-people (arguing that 
U.S. accession to the ICC would be unconstitutional). 
215 Id. 
216 See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983 (2008). 
217 The exact scope of such review, its procedures, governing standards, and 
operational institutions could be determined by negotiations between the United States and 
the current ICC State Parties. 
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States would get assurance that its court system could review ICC 
convictions of Americans and, if appropriate, grant relief to such 
persons. The ICC, in turn, would secure U.S. participation as a State 
Party as well as its full support, with all the power and prestige that 
such support would entail. ICC investigations against Americans 
could, if appropriate, proceed. And convictions against Americans 
would still be possible and would still carry huge significance, even if 
subsequent U.S. review would lead to the release of the defendant. 
The suggestion here is that supra-national criminal jurisdiction 
might itself be subject to nation-state review. Implicitly, international 
lawyers and academic commentators assume a strict hierarchy 
running up from sub-state actors at the bottom, nation-state actors in 
the middle, and supra-national actors at the top.218 And international 
courts are designed as top-level courts subject to no further review. 
The European Court of Human Rights, for instance, is a classic 
example of a supra-national court whose very purpose is to bind the 
functional nation-state legal systems “below” it to human rights 
standards.219 But where an international institution takes direct 
functional jurisdiction—and includes executive functions like the 
ICC’s Prosecutor—then it is legitimate to suggest that it too should be 
bound by some supervisory authority. Of course, allowing a powerful 
country, such as the United States, to supervise ICC judgments 
against its citizens would constrain the ICC’s independence, and, 
insofar as the United States alone would enjoy such supervisory 
jurisdiction, it would violate the norm of nation-state equality. But 
supporters of the ICC, and Internationalists more generally, need to 
take seriously the idea that jurisdictional pluralism implies bounds on 
the international court as much as it allows for international 
jurisdiction over conduct that takes place within nation-states. 
Thus, my counterintuitive proposal to allow U.S. review of ICC 
convictions of Americans serves three purposes. First, it reflects a 
basic U.S. commitment to ensuring that its citizens are afforded due 
process before they may be criminally punished. Second, it suggests a 
political compromise between the United States and the ICC that, 
	
218 It is admittedly difficult to jettison such hierarchical thinking. This Article too relies 
on hierarchical imagery describing sub-national jurisdictional claims as challenges from 
“below” and supra-national claims as challenges from the “top.” 
219 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, pmbl., 
art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1955) (describing aim of Convention to “secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction” the fundamental “rights and freedoms” codified 
therein). 
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however unlikely, might make Americans more open to ICC 
membership. And, most importantly, it adds a new model for 
mapping the relationship between nation-state legal systems and 
international legal regimes. Nation-state courts, that is, could 
themselves exercise supervisory jurisdiction over international legal 
regimes, especially where the latter have direct functional jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Reports of the death of the nation-state are much exaggerated. 
Nation-states will continue to be the primary jurisdictional agents of 
criminal justice—the principal legislators, enforcers, and adjudicators 
of criminal law—for the foreseeable future. But sub-state and supra-
state challenges to that jurisdiction are not going away, and criminal 
justice officials and legal commentators must come to grips with the 
reality of partially autonomous criminal justice regimes at the sub-
state and supra-state levels. The current fights among Sovereigntists, 
Internationalists, and Pluralists are not going to end in decisive 
victory for any one vision of criminal jurisdiction. A Bounded 
Pluralism approach, however, offers a way forward that honors 
nation-state values while allowing for supra-national and sub-national 
assertions of jurisdiction. 
To be sure, Bounded Pluralism will not resolve all the major 
disputes of sub-state and supra-state criminal jurisdiction, even if it 
were adopted today as official U.S. policy. As a compromise, it 
cannot satisfy many of the most fervent advocates of tribal 
sovereignty or the most passionate promoters of international criminal 
enforcement. 
Some tribal activists and their supporters object to the already-
existing federal supervisory jurisdiction over tribal criminal justice.220 
They want full-spectrum functional jurisdiction without supervision 
from the federal courts. After all, they argue, a truly “sovereign” 
entity does not submit itself to review by another power.221 
	
220 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 132, at 271–72 (criticizing federal oversight over tribal 
justice). 
221 See, e.g., Mark Savage, The Great Secret About Federal Indian Law—Two Hundred 
Years in Violation of the Constitution—and the Opinion the Supreme Court Should Have 
Written to Reveal It, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 344 (1993) (arguing against 
federal “plenary” authority over Indian tribes’ internal affairs); see also United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he sovereign is, by 
definition, the entity ‘in which independent and supreme authority is vested’” and thus 
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Moreover, defenders of maximal tribal sovereignty have argued that 
imposing American standards of due process on tribal criminal 
processes is nothing less than cultural imperialism in the name of 
legal liberalism.222 
At the same time, although nothing like the kind of approach I have 
suggested for the ICC exists, one can well anticipate that any nation-
state review of ICC convictions would be anathema to most of the 
international court’s supporters. Nation-state review of an ICC 
conviction would effectively repatriate the case to the nation-state 
level and thus undermine the very premise of an international criminal 
court. If abused, such review might allow the United States—and any 
other country that successfully demanded such review—to effectively 
shield its citizens from international justice and thus resurrect 
precisely the impunity for human rights atrocities that the ICC was 
created to combat.223 
The Bounded Pluralism approach is thus unlikely to win over those 
dedicated to complete tribal independence or to a completely 
independent international criminal court. A criminal regime that must 
adhere to American norms of due process and habeas-like review by 
American courts is, indeed, a bound regime. 
Nevertheless, tribal courts and the ICC could exercise significant 
functional jurisdiction and accomplish most, if not all, of their goals 
within a system of Bounded Pluralism. Even within tightly bound 
constraints, tribal criminal justice systems today provide crucial law 
enforcement functions for tribal members, as well as significant 
opportunities for community building and self-regulation. The 
existence of federal supervisory jurisdiction does nothing to prevent 
tribes from improving the quality of criminal justice they provide 
	
arguing that commitments to both tribal sovereignty and plenary Congressional authority 
over tribes are incompatible). 
222 What to do when pluralist commitments to communal rights clash with liberal 
commitments to individual rights is an important and complex problem in contemporary 
politics and political theory. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD 
FOR WOMEN? (1999); AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001). 
223 Moreover, under the principle of complementarity embodied in the Rome Statute, 
the ICC takes jurisdiction of a case only if it determines that no national government is 
able or willing to investigate and/or prosecute the alleged crime. Rome Statute, supra note 
45, art. 17, § 1(a). Thus, for instance, if an American were ever convicted by the ICC, the 
ICC necessarily would have already determined that the United States was either unable or 
unwilling to properly exercise its own jurisdiction over the individual. It would be very 
odd, then, for the ICC to give the United States supervisory jurisdiction to review the 
conviction, even for adherence to fundamental due process. 
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right now, and the Grand Bargain I propose in this Article would 
significantly increase the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction.224 As 
for the International Criminal Court, it is true that any provision 
allowing for U.S. review of ICC convictions would undermine the 
ICC’s legitimacy in the eyes of some—especially if the United States 
were the only country to secure such review. And grafting a review 
process onto the ICC today is, of course, much more difficult than it 
would have been to create such a mechanism at the creation of the 
court. Still, nothing that the ICC has already accomplished would be 
diminished by the existence of such U.S. review, and the ICC could 
continue to serve exactly the role it intends even with such review. 
ICC prosecutors could continue to investigate alleged crimes, indict 
those it deems responsible, and punish them if they are found guilty. 
The development of international criminal law—and the human rights 
norms behind the law—could continue. And if Bounded Pluralism 
were successful in enticing the United States to join the ICC as a full 
State Party—a big if—then the cause of international criminal 
enforcement would be immeasurably enhanced, even if it came at the 
perceived cost of some special provisions for American defendants. 
In sum, the Bounded Pluralism approach describes and justifies a 
particular way to manage the tensions inherent in jurisdictional 
overlap. It does not demand that the nation-state either fiercely resist 
or fully embrace the various sub-state and supra-state assertions of 
criminal jurisdiction that it faces; rather, it suggests a way in which 
the nation-state can remain faithful to its national values, while 
recognizing the legitimacy of certain international and sub-national 
jurisdictional claims. At a deeper level, perhaps, Bounded Pluralism 
might mirror the way each of us endeavors to honor the multiple 
allegiances that make up our identities while staying true to a core set 
of personal values. 
  
	
224 Nobody has argued that law and order on reservations suffers because tribes adhere 
to the due process provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 
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